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The directive Solvency II harmonizes the insurance regulation in the European
Union. A central aspect of the regulatory framework is the calibration of the
Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) as a capital buffer insurers and reinsurers
are required to hold. The SCR can be calculated based on a regulatory model.
The so called standard formula follows a modular approach where capital require-
ments for sub-risk elements are calculated and subsequently aggregated. Thus, the
standard formula requires two input parameters – capital requirements of risk ele-
ments and dependence measures between them. This thesis examines the scenario-
based approach to calibrate those input parameters for property risk and equity
risk, two sub-modules of the risk module market risk. The regulatory scenario-
based approach follows calibrations based on historical market data and includes
the application of rolling-window annualization. Unfortunately, this methodology
causes severe distortions in calibration results for both input parameters. In this
thesis alternative approaches to regulatory risk calibrations are examined. This
includes the application of Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) to gather a suf-
ficient amount of historical data. Outcomes of empirical calculations based on
FHS annual returns imply, that the regulatory calibration approach is exposed to
overestimate equity as well as property risk while diversification effects might be
underestimated. Additionally, alternative approaches to determine the correlation
between risk elements are examined. This also includes the calibration of correla-
tion coefficients on a more granular level. Empirical investigations show, that the
assumption of perfect correlation within the equity category ”other equity” cannot
be verified. Diversification effects might mistakenly be neglected. For property
risk, the decision of no further breakdown into sub-categories can be supported.
Lastly, the choice of Value-at-Risk (VaR) as appropriate risk measure for Solvency
II risk calibrations is discussed since authorities of other regulatory frameworks
like Solvency II’s Swiss equivalent Swiss Solvency Test (SST) decided differently.
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Solvency II is a supervisory framework for the insurance and reinsurance sector
with the purpose to reform and to harmonize insurance regulation throughout the
European Union (EU). The new directive is a project of the European Commission
which was initiated decades ago and became applicable as of the 1st of January
2016.
One of Solvency II’s main objectives is to ensure insurance and reinsurance compa-
nies are holding sufficient economic capital to fulfill their responsibilities towards
policyholders and beneficiaries. This capital buffer is referred to as Solvency Cap-
ital Requirement (SCR). A fundamental innovation of Solvency II in comparison
to former legacies, often referred to as Solvency I, is the risk-based calculation of
capital requirements. This implies that the calibration of the SCR is tailored to
an insurer’s or reinsurer’s individual risk structure [European Commission, 2007].
By definition, the SCR covers unexpected losses which will not be exceeded with
a probability of 99.5% and an assumed holding period of 12 month. For the cali-
bration of the SCR, insurance and reinsurance companies can either make use of
a formula provided by the regulator, develop their own internal model, or use a
mixture of both. The regulatory standard formula has a modular structure. Risks
insurance or reinsurance undertakings might be exposed to, are categorized into
risk modules which themselves comprise sub-risk elements. The overall SCR is
calculated by the calibration of capital requirements for those sub-risks and the
subsequent step-by-step aggregation to the highest level.
In 2015 more than three quarters of all insurance and reinsurance undertakings
under Solvency II indicated their intention to base SCR calculations on the stan-
dard formula – either completely or at least partially [KPMG, 2015]. Hence, a
1
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flawless calibration of the standard formula’s input parameters is of great impor-
tance to ensure sound risk management in the insurance and reinsurance sector
throughout the European Union.
During the development of Solvency II, a lot of time, effort and knowledge was put
into the design of the standard formula and the calibration of its input parameters.
Even though the final implementation of the Solvency II framework already took
place, this process is not concluded yet. The concept of Solvency II is designed
as a lively framework open for development and improvement rather than a rigid
legislation which is supposed to be applicable in its original form for the following
decades. To ensure resilient risk management, regulatory frameworks in general
need to be able to respond to economic developments in the concerning market.
Moreover, the Solvency II framework and specifically the standard formula might
still contain inconsistencies which require particular attention.
In the course of Solvency II’s go-live in January 2016, Gabriel Bernardino, Chair-
man of the insurance regulation authority (EIOPA) stated the following on this
matter:
”Now with Solvency II a modern, robust and proportionate super-
visory regime will be implemented. This is a huge step forward for en-
hanced policyholder protection and the single European insurance mar-
ket. However, this is not a time for complacency” [EIOPA, 2016b].
In fact, the insurance regulation authority EIOPA already scheduled additional
work on Solvency II for the time after its implementation. From regulatory side
it is declared that future work on Solvency II will specifically involve the review
of the SCR standard formula [EIOPA, 2016a].
The developments in the emergence of Solvency II have opened up discussions in
the academic world, too. A wide range of academic publications is concerned with
a variety of challenges and drawbacks concerning the regulatory framework its
calibrations. Some of them even contributed to the decisions and developments on
the regulatory side. On behalf of the role of academic research in the development
of regulatory frameworks Paul Embrechts stated that
”[...] academia has a crucial role to play in commenting officially
on proposed changes in the regulatory landscape. Second, when well-
documented, properly researched and effectively communicated, we may
have an influence on regulatory and industry practice”[Embrechts et al.,
2014, p. 2].
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1.2 Subjects and Aims
This thesis is concerned with calibration approaches, limitations and possible al-
ternatives regarding regulatory risk calibrations in Solvency II. Here, the focus is
on two specific risk elements – equity risk and property risk. Both are sub-risks
of the risk module market risk. Basically, the intentions behind this thesis can be
divided into three blocks.
1. Review of regulatory standard formula input parameter calibrations.
2. Outline of limitations regarding regulatory risk calibrations.
3. Introduction and analysis of alternative approaches.
The calculation of capital requirements occupies an important part of Solvency II.
The calibration of standard formula parameters is challenging for most of the risks,
an insurance or reinsurance company may face. The purpose of the first block is
to better understand the regulator’s approach to calibrate standard formula input
parameters specifically for the sub-risk modules equity and property. Methodolog-
ical descriptions and empirical reproductions aim to bring clarity about obstacles
the regulator had to overcome and decisions it had to take in consequence.
The second block comprises the outline of problems regarding SCR calibrations
based on the standard formula. This part aims to highlight severe consequences
of regulatory calibration procedures. This part of the thesis aims to reveal, how
regulatory decisions and simplifications throughout the calibration process of stan-
dard formula input parameters alter resulting capital requirements.
The third purpose of this thesis is to introduce alternative calibration approaches
which aim to avoid distortions the regulatory approach might cause. Empirical
analysis shows differences in calibration outcomes between the regulatory approach
and its alternatives.
1.3 Structure
In the second chapter basic statistical definitions are introduced. The focus is on
terms and concepts in the field of financial risk management. This contains the
introduction of certain risk measures, the concept of dependency and specific as-
pects of (financial) time series analysis. Also, the random sampling methodology
bootstrapping is explained.
The third chapter addresses the long-term project Solvency II. First, a general
description of the Solvency II directive and its additional components is given. In
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the further course, the standard formula and is structure as well as the calibra-
tion of its input parameters is described. The last part of the chapter focuses on
structure and calibration of the market risk module and specifically its sub-risk
modules equity and property.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the stability of regulatory risk calibrations and possi-
ble alternatives to the regulatory approach. It provides the basis for the empirical
analysis comprised by this thesis. First, general concerns are discussed. Subse-
quently, specific parts of regulatory risk calibrations are questioned and alternative
approaches are introduced.
Chapter 5 contains the empirical part of this thesis. The first section introduces
the data used for the analysis. The following sections comprise main findings of
empirical investigations.
The final chapter summarizes the results and draws conclusions.
The appendix comprises additional concepts and proofs for the methodological




Chapter 2 introduces basic terms and concepts used in this thesis. The first sec-
tion deals with the quantification of risk in general and introduces two important
risk measures. The second part is concerned with the concept of dependence.
Together, the two sections build the basis for the calibration of standard formula
input parameters. The third part of this chapter discusses selected areas of (fi-
nancial) time series analysis. The last section introduces the random sampling
methodology bootstrapping. Section 3 and Section 4 are important for the under-
standing of specific problems concerning regulatory calibration approaches as well
as the methodology of alternative approaches discussed in this paper.
2.1 Risk Measures
A central aspect of risk management is given by the quantification of risk. This
is accomplished by risk measures which have, among others, the purpose to de-
termine the amount of economic capital a financial institution is required to hold
against unexpected losses.
In a mathematical context, a future value of any financial position is represented
by the random variable X. Comparably, L = −X refers to the random variable
representing the financial position’s future loss. FL denotes the corresponding cu-
mulative distribution function, also referred to as loss distribution. A risk measure
is then given by the mapping ρ(L) of the random variable L1 to a real number.
Based on [McNeil et al., 2005], two important and well known risk measures are
introduced in the following.
1Note that the formal definitions given in this chapter are based on loss distributions. For
the empirical part of this thesis, risk measures are largely calibrated based on the historical
distribution of actual returns instead of losses. This results in a change of signs but does not
effect the understanding and interpretation of the risk measure in general.
5
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Value-at-Risk
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) describes the loss which will not be exceeded given a
certain probability (1−α). α is also referred to as confidence level. Formally, VaR
is given by
ρ(L) = V aRα(L) = inf{l ∈ R : P (L > l) ≤ 1− α}
= inf{l ∈ R : FL(l) ≥ α}. (2.1)
V aRα is therefore represented by the α-quantil of the loss distribution FL.
Expected Shortfall
For a given confidence level α, the Expected Shortfall (ES) describes the expected
value of the loss given the loss is higher than the corresponding value of V aRα.
That is,
ρ(L) = ESα = E(L|L > V aRα). (2.2)
2.2 Correlation and Dependency
In a statistical environment, dependency describes the relationship between two
random variables. Several approaches are conceivable to determine the dependence
– but not all of them are suitable in any situation. In this section, two different
concepts will be introduced. Both are discussed in [Embrechts et al., 2003].
Linear Correlation
A well known method to measure the correlation between two random variables







ρX,Y can equal values between [-1,1]. If ρX,Y equals 0, the random variables X
and Y are independent. Nonetheless, the converse does not hold in general. This
is caused by a special property of linear correlation which solely covers the linear
part of dependency. Another pitfall is that linear correlation coefficients are only
defined for finite variances.
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Tail Dependence
Tail dependence coefficients measure the strength of dependence in the tails of
the bivariate distribution of a pair of random variables. They give an estimation
about extremal dependence, meaning the likelihood of a coincidental appearance
of extreme events. This is especially interesting for heavy-tailed distributions.
Other than linear correlation, tail dependence does not depend on the marginal
distribution of the two random variables but is rather based on their copula2.
It can be distinguished between the upper and the lower tail dependence coefficient.
With a given pair of continuous random variables X1 and X2 and their respective
marginal distributions FX1 and FX2 the latter is given by
λl(X1, X2) = lim
q→0+









P (X2 ≤ F
−1
X2













with C(q, q) denoting the copula of the bivariate distribution of the random vari-
ables X1 and X2 and provided the limit λl ∈ [0, 1] exists. X1 and X2 exhibit lower
tail dependence if λl ∈ (0, 1]. If λl = 0, X1 and X2 are said to be asymptotically
independent.
2.3 Financial Time Series Analysis
Financial time series analysis is concerned with the development of assets over
time. In this section, selected concepts of this area will be introduced.
Returns
In most cases, it is more convenient to investigate price changes instead of the
prices itself. Those changes in price are referred to as returns. In general, it is
distinguished between discrete and continuous returns. Discrete returns can be
further divided into net returns and gross returns. In this thesis, we deal with
discrete net returns. Given an asset price Pt at time t, the k-period net return is
2For a short introduction to copulas refer to Annex A.






k refers to the length of period for example one day, one week or one year [Tsay,
2005].
Stationarity
The analysis of time series is often based on certain assumptions. The concept of
stationarity is basic in this context. It can be distinguished between strict and
weak stationarity. Strict stationarity is a very strong condition and hard to verify
whereas weak stationarity is a common and most often required assumption in
time series modeling. In order to be weakly stationary, a time series rt must fulfill
(a) E(rt) = µ ∀t and
(b) Cov(rt, rt−l) = γl.
In other words, a time series rt is weakly stationary if its mean µ is constant over
time and the covariance between rt and rt+l only depends on the lag l between
them rather then the values themselves.
Time series failing this property are often referred to as unit-root nonstationary
time series. A well known example for such a time series is the Random Walk,
that is
rt = rt−1 + at (2.6)
where at be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with constant mean and variance,
further referred to as White Noise [Tsay, 2005].
ARMA-GARCH Models
The collection of tools for the analysis of financial time series includes a large
number of econometric models with different properties3. Examples are AutoRe-
gressive Moving Average (ARMA) models and Generalized AutoRegressive Con-
ditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) models. The latter allows for volatile variances
over time. Both modes can be combined to ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(m,n) models.
3A detailed explanation of various time series models can for example be found in [Tsay,
2005]
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A time series rt follows an ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(m,n) model if it satisfies









ψjat−j + at (2.7)
with
at = σtǫt, σ
2











zt is i.i.d. with constant variance 1. For the paramterts it holds α0 > 0, αi ≥ 1
∀i = 1, . . .m, βj ≥ 0 ∀j = 0, . . . s, φi ≥ 0 ∀i = 0, . . . p, ψj ≥ 0 ∀j = 0, . . . q
and
∑max(m,s)
i=1 (αi + βi) < 1. The last constraint ensures that the unconditional
variance of the innovation at is finite while the conditional variance evolves over
time [Tsay, 2005].
Information Criteria
Information criteria are used to estimate the order of an appropriate time series
model. Given a set of time series models with different orders, the information
criteria help to select one of them as an appropriate fit of the analyzed data. Two
well known criteria will be briefly introduced in the following. Both are discussed
in [Burnham and Anderson, 2004].
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a likelihood based criterion. The AIC
aims to minimize the distance between the model and the true value while using
as few parameters as possible on the same time. The criteria is given by
AIC = −2× log
(
L(θ̂|x1, . . . , xT )
)
+ 2×K (2.9)
withK denoting the number of parameters related to the order of the model. With
x1, . . . , xT denoting the observed data and θ̂ denoting the vector of estimated pa-
rameters, L(θ̂|x1, . . . , xT ) represents the likelihood function of θ̂. The first part of
Equation 2.9 evaluates the distance between the model and the truth and therefore
the goodness of fit of the model. The second part is referred to as the penalty
function of the criterion since it penalizes the model for each additional parameter
is uses.
The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is closely related to the AIC. It can
be derived by
BIC = −2× ln
(
L(θ̂|x1, . . . , xT )
)
+ ln(T )×K (2.10)
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Equation 2.9 and equation2.10 show, that the definitions of AIC and BIC are
similar to each other. However, in comparison to Akaike’s criterion, the BIC
considered the sample size T of the observed data x1, . . . , xT in the penalty term
of the function.
2.4 Random Sampling: Bootstrapping
The resampling technique bootstrapping was introduced by [Efron, 1979]. Given
a random sample, bootstrapping aims to estimate the unknown distribution of
a prespecified random variable based on observed data. In other words, boot-
strapping can be used to determine parameters without making any parametric
assumptions about the distribution of the corresponding random variables.
Let X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) denote a random sample of size n with realizations
x = (x1, x2, . . . xn). Let the random variables follow an unspecified distribution F,
such that
Xi = xi, Xi
i.i.d
∼ F i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let R(F,X) denote some prespecified random variable depending on X and F .
Traditionally, R(F,X) represents a parameter of interest, e.g. the mean or the
Value-at-Risk of F . The goal of bootstrapping is to estimate the sampling dis-
tribution of the random variable R(F,X). The bootstrap methodology works as
follows
1. Construct a sample probability distribution F̂ by assigning a probability of
1
n
for each observed data point x1, x2 . . . xn.







∼ F̂ i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The resulting sample is called bootstrap sample X∗ = (X∗1 , X
∗
2 , . . . X
∗
n) with
realizations x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . x
∗
n).
3. Use the bootstrap sample approximate R(F,X) by the bootstrap estimate
θ = R(X∗, ˆ(F )).
4. Repeat step 2 and 3 T times to obtain T bootstrap samples x∗
1
, . . . , x∗
T
and
T bootstrap estimates θ1, . . . θT .
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Bootstrap confidence intervals
Step four results in T bootstrap estimates. Based on those, a bootstrap confidence
interval can be derived as follows
1. Order θ1, . . . θT . from the smallest value to the largest: θ(1), . . . θ(T ).
2. Choose a confidence level α and find the T (1− α
2
) and T (α
2
) estimate. Those









] is an (1− α) bootstrap confidence interval.
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Solvency II
3.1 Solvency II Directive
Solvency II is a project of the European Union (EU) with the purpose to reform
the previous insurance supervision law, often referred to as Solvency I, and to
enforce a harmonized EU insurance regulation. The legislation of Solvency II was
implemented in several stages. The basis of the regulation forms the EU Directive
2009/138/EC adopted in November 2009. This Solvency II directive is assigned to
Level 1. The development ot the Solvency II framework was technically advised by
the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), former
CEIOPS (Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervi-
sions)1. Between 2005 and 2009, CEIOPS/EIOPA conducted five field tests known
as Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS). Based on the outcomes of the five impact
studies and as requested by the European Commission (EC), CEIOPS/EIOPA
provided technical advise on implementing measures, known as Level 2 Advices.
On a third level, CEIOPS/EIOPA provided supervisory guidelines and recommen-
dations. The Solvency II directive came into force as of the 1st of January 2016.
The structure of Solvency II follows a three-pillar approach. Each pillar covers a
specific sector to assure sound risk management.
• Pillar I focuses on the quantitative topics. It specifies a Solvency Capital
Requirement (SCR) and a Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) to ensure
the solvency of an insurance or reinsurance undertaking.
• Pillar II is concerned with qualitative requirements in insurance and rein-
surance companies. This part of Solvency II aims to assure the application,
1In the following, we will not distinguish between CEIOPS and EIOPA and will refer to both
as CEIOPS/EIOPA
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maintenance, and regulation of an efficient risk management system within
the companies.
• Pillar III deals with the transparency of companies in the insurance and
reinsurance sector. It contains requirements concerning the disclosure of risk
management towards the supervising regulator as well as the market.







































Solvency II Framework 
Figure 3.1: Structure of Solvency II: Three-pillar approach2.
[BaFin, 2016].
Pillar I includes one of the main aspects of the Solvency II framework – the calcu-
lation of the risk-based Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR). The purpose of the
SCR is to
2Figure 3.1 based on [Lloyds, 2010].
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”. . . reflect a level of eligible own funds that enables insurance and
reinsurance undertakings to absorb significant losses and that gives rea-
sonable assurance to policy holders and beneficiaries that payments will
be made as they fall due.’ [European Commission, 2009, p.13, Article
(62)].
The SCR calculations can be based either on an internally developed model, in
accordance to the standard formula provided by the regulator or by mixture of
both. This thesis will specifically focus on features and idiosyncrasies of the stan-
dard formula.
3.2 SCR Standard Formula
Based on the standard formula, the SCR is calculated by the sum of three parts,
the Basic Solvency Capital Requirement (Basic SCR), the capital requirement
covering operational risk and adjustments. The Basic SCR can be considered as
the main part of the overall Solvency Capital Requirement. It covers five types of
risks identified as risk modules:
1. non-life underwriting risk,
2. life underwriting risk,
3. health underwriting risk,
4. market risk,
5. credit risk.
In most cases, the five individual risk modules can be further divided into sub-
modules, which could possibly comprise sub-modules themselves. According to
[EIOPA, 2014], the overall structure of the standard formula can be summarized
as follows
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Figure 3.2: Segmentation of the standard formula in its risk modules and
sub-modules. [EIOPA, 2014].
The structure of the standard formula already implies its application. It follows a
modular approach and is applied in a stepwise, bottom-up manner. First capital
requirements are calculated for (sub-) modules of the lowest level. This is followed
by the stepwise aggregation of capital requirements. Consequently, on the highest










ρi,j · SCRi · SCRj, (3.1)
where SCRi and SCRj represent the capital charges for the ith and jth risk module
and ρi,j the correlation between them. Since the Basic SCR comprises five risk
modules i and j can attain values between 1 and 5 on this level.
In case the risk module can be further divided, capital charges for sub-risks can










ρk,l · SCRk · SCRl, (3.2)
where SCRi and SCRj respectively represent the capital charges for sub-module
i’s risk elements and ρk,l the correlation between them. k and l can attain values
between 1 and ni where ni denotes the number of risk elements comprised by risk
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module i. Independent from its aggregation level, the application of the standard
formula requires two input parameters:
• Capital charges for each sub-risk comprised by the considered risk module.
• Correlation coefficients describing the dependence of each possible combina-
tion of sub-risks comprised by the considered risk module.
3.2.1 Sub-risk Capital Requirements
Capital charges for sub-risks arise from the aggregation of their risk elements
according to equation 3.2. On the lowest level, meaning in case the concerning
risk is not further divided into sub-risks, the capital requirements are directly
linked to the 99.5% VaR associated with the concerning risk module. This is
constituted on the Solvency II Level 1 guidelines which demands that insurance
and reinsurance undertakings
”will still be in a position with a probability of at least 99.5%, to meet
their obligations to policyholders and beneficiaries over the following
twelve month.” [European Commission, 2009, p.13, Article (64)].
The regulatory approach to calibrate VaR depends on the structure and character-
istics of the individual risk modules. For many of them scenario-based approaches
are applied, meaning risk calibrations are directly based on historical data of rep-
resenting financial intstruments.
3.2.2 Correlation Coefficients
To aggregate capital charges of risk elements, a parameter estimating the correla-
tion between those elements is required. The most common and probably easiest
approach to measure dependence is the linear correlation coefficient also known as
Pearson correlation. However, linear correlation does not fully reflect the overall
dependence structure for each and every class of probability distributions. In those
cases, the use of linear correlation could lead to spurious aggregation results. Un-
fortunately, risks insurance and reinsurance undertakings are exposed to exhibit
characteristics distorting the aggregation results when using linear correlation as
a dependence measure. These include skewed probability distributions and the
existence of tail dependencies. CEIOPS/EIOPA is fully aware of this problem and
thus proposes the use tail correlation coefficients instead of Pearson correlation to
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measure the dependence between risks [CEIOPS, 2010c]. To obtain tail correlation
coefficients, CEIOPS/EIOPA discusses two different approaches.
VaR-implied correlation
The VaR-implied correlation approach3 is based on the inversion of the standard
formula. Let r1 and r2 denote the returns of two different assets
4. Let rp denote
the portfolio return of an equally weighted5 combination of r1 and r2, meaning









2 + 2ρr1,r2VaR(r1)VaR(r2) (3.3)
with ρr1,r2 denoting the correlation for the risk components r1 and r2. Based on
CEIOPS/EIOPA’s Level 2 Advice concerning Correlations, ρr1,r2 should be chosen
”in such way as to achieve the best approximation of the 99.5% VaR
for the aggregated capital requirement.” [CEIOPS, 2010c, p. 9, Article
3.15]





2 + 2ρr1,r2VaR(r1)VaR(r2)| (3.4)
[CEIOPS, 2010c]. The minimization of aggregation error 3.4 is given by a trans-








3CEIOPS/EIOPA does not explicitly talk about VaR-implied correlation. However, in the
literature, the methodology described in its Level 2 Advice is often referred to this term. See for
example in [Mittnik, 2013].
4For the sake of simplicity, we assume that r1 and r2 are elliptically distribution with zero
expectation.
5Without loss of generality, we assume rp = w1r1 + w2r2 with w1, w2 = 0.5
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As a coefficient of correlation, ρVaRr1,r2α is bounded in the interval [−1, 1]. This
constraint is not given in general. Since













⇔ VaR(rp) ≥ VaR(r1) + VaR(r2)
and









2 ≥ (VaR(r1)− VaR(r2))
2
⇔ VaR(rp) ≤ |VaR(r1) + VaR(r2)|





+1, if VaR(rp) ≥ VaR(r1) + VaR(r2)






Another approach is proposed by CEIOPS/EIOPA under the name of data-cutting
method. Associated with a given (1−α)% VaR or respectively a given α−quantile
cthe idea is to compute common Pearson correlations from joint tail observations
which comprise all those pairs of observations simultaneously falling below their
respective α quantile.
Let r1, r2 again denote risk components evoked by two different asset price changes.
Then the data cutting correlation coefficient denoted by ρDCr1,r2α is given by
ρDCr1,r2α = Corr(r1, r2|X1 < VaRα(r1), r2 < VaRα(r2)) (3.7)
[Mittnik, 2011]. Like capital requirements, tail correlation coefficients are calcu-
lated on the basis of historical market data of financial instruments for the majority
of risk categories.
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3.3 Market Risk
The Basic SCR is obtained by the aggregation of five risk modules. Figure 3.3
shows their average proportion. By far the largest of the five components of the
standard formula is represented by the risk module market risk.
Figure 3.3: Decomposition of the BSCR (diversified) [EIOPA, 2011].
Market risk itself comprises seven sub-modules. In the following, we will mainly





































Figure 3.4: The segmentation of the standard formula in its risk modules and
their sub-modules with a focus on the sub-modules of interest for this thesis6.
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3.3.1 Equity Risk
Equity risk is divided into two categories – ”global equity” and ”other equity”. The
category ”global equity” covers equities listed in European Economic Area (EEA)
countries or countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). The equity category ”others” is more diverse and covers
several equity types. This includes non-listed equities or equities listed in countries
which are not EEA/OECD, private equities, hedge funds, commodities ant other
alternative financial instruments. In accordance with the standard formula, capital










where ρglobal,other denotes the correlation between the two equity categories and
SCR2global, SCR
2
other the categories’ capital charges.
CEIOPS/EIOPA’s calibrations concerning the input parameters of equation 3.8
are based on the so called scenario-based approach. For the category ”global
equity” the regulator concludes a capital charge of −45%, also referred to as
stress factor or shock scenario. For the category ”other equities” a stress fac-
tor of −55% is proposed. For the correlation between the two equity categories,
CEIOPS/EIOPA proposes a correlation coefficient of 0.75 [CEIOPS, 2010a].
3.3.2 Property Risk
Like for the sub-risk module equity, standard formula input parameters for prop-
erty risk are derived on the basis of a scenario based approach. However, unlike
in the first case, the sub-risk module property is not further divided into sub-
categories. Thus, CEIOPS/EIOPA only derives a single shock scenario for the
sub-risk module property. The regulator’s analysis results in a stress factor of
−25%. The relinquishment of a breakdown into different property classes also re-
sults in the assumption of perfect correlation within the sub-risk module[CEIOPS,
2010b].
Chapter 4
Stability of Regulatory Risk
Calibrations and its Alternatives
The project of Solvency II not only comprises the development of the legal frame-
work itself but also numerous additional publications, studies, advices and discus-
sions. A crucial facet is given by five field tests where insurance and reinsurance
companies throughout the European Union were invited to test the quantitative
aspects of the Solvency II framework. Findings of those exercises were used to
develop advices on a second level, so called Level 2 Implementing Measures that
complete and implement the Solvency II Level 1 Framework Directive. There-
with, the development of the Solvency II framework incorporated lessons learned.
Nonetheless, parts of the final Solvency II Directive are controversially discussed
since the beginning of the project.
Criticism and comments are raised concerning various parts of the Solvency II
framework.[Pfeifer and Strassburger, 2008] as well as [Sandström, 2007] deal with
properties of individual risk distributions and their effect on the stability of the
standard formula. The underlying probability distributions of risks an insurance
or reinsurance undertaking is exposed to are not normal but rather skewed. Both
authors discuss the effect of neglecting those characteristics. They stress the need
to calibrate for skewness of risk distributions in order to maintain the standard
formula’s recommended level of confidence. However, it should be noted that the
findings of both authors attracted CEIOPS/EIOPA’s attention. Two years after
the two publications, CEIOPS/EIOPA revealed their Level 2 Advice which ad-
dresses in depth the calibration of correlation parameters. Based on the authors’
research, the regulator discusses certain characteristics shared by many risks rein-
surance and insurance undertakings are exposed to and proposes alternative cor-
relation approaches to calibrate for them [CEIOPS, 2010c].
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[Aria et al., 2010] point their criticism in a more specified direction. For the
scenario-based calibration approaches of certain risk-modules, the authors scruti-
nize the suitability of the corresponding representing market data. Similar con-
cerns are raised concerning the choice of representative indexes for the risk module
property. CEIOPS/EIOPA bases its analysis on historical data for the United
Kingdom (UK) property market. This choice has been argued from various sides.
UK property market are not considered to be able to cover the complexity and
diversity of property risk throughout the European market.
In the following we will mainly focus on two rather fundamental problems con-
cerning the regulatory calibration of standard formula input parameters – specif-
ically concerning equity and property risk. The first part is concerned with the
handling of historical data used for scenario-based calibration approaches. Sub-
sequently, several aspects concerning the aggregation of sub-risk module capital
requirements will be assessed. As an excursus, we will discuss the appropriate
choice of risk measures in regulatory frameworks.
4.1 Risk Calibrations based on Historical Data
The calibration of standard formula input parameters concerning equity and prop-
erty risk is subject to a scenario-based approach which includes analysis carried
out on historical market data. Risk measure calibrations on the basis of historical
data are referred to as Historical Simulation (HS). The determination of the his-
torical VaR follows a simple concept. First, the return series is ordered from the
lowest to the highest value. The (1 − α)n smallest observation then denotes the
(1 − α)% VaR, where n denotes the length of the historical time series [Li et al.,
n.d.].
4.1.1 Rolling-Window Annualization
Solvency II demands capital requirement calibrations subject to a 99.5% probabil-
ity of remaining solvent within a one year horizon. Therewith, VaR calibrations
are associated with a ”one in 200 years event”, meaning the likelihood of an in-
surer being ruined must not exceed one in 200 cases. Historical VaR calibrations
therefore require at least 200 years of historical data for each representing index.
However, in the majority of cases, annual data is not available in a sufficient
amount. To overcome this problem, CEIOPS/EIOPA proposes a methodology to
compute annual data out of data on a daily basis using 12-month rolling windows.
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A return computed by this methodology is further referred to as annualized return




, t = 260, . . . , n. (4.1)
where Pt denotes the daily closing price of an asset at day t and n the number
of days where data is available. Similarly annualized returns can be calculated on




, t = 13, . . . , n. (4.2)
Here, Pt refers to monthly closing prices whereas n denotes the number of available
monthly data points. The rolling-window annualization results in almost as many
annualized returns as daily returns are available.
However, the annualization procedure implicates severe problems. The resulting
returns overlap to a large extent and hence share a lot of information. [Mittnik,
2011] analyzes consequences of this procedure in general and shows severe contor-
tions affecting the dependence structure of the return series over time as well as
across different assets. Thus, with regard to standard formula calibrations, both
input parameters are affected. The rolling-window annualization can imply highly
unstable VaR calibration results and simultaneously, it might severely distort the
correlation structures between risk modules.
CEIOPS/EIOPA was well aware of the problems arising from one-year rolling-
window returns. On this matter the regulator stated:
”There is a balance to be struck between an analysis based on the richest
possible set of relevant data and the possibility of distortion resulting
from autocorrelation” [CEIOPS, 2010a, p. 8, Article 3.12 ].
Nonetheless, CEIOPS/EIOPA decided to hazard the consequences in favor of the
method’s advantages.
”In this case, we have chosen to take a rolling one-year window in
order to make use of the greatest possible quantity of relevant data”
[CEIOPS, 2010a, p. 9, Article 3.12 ].
In the following, we will introduce a possible alternative to simulate a sufficient
amount of annualized data for scenario-based approaches to calibrate standard
formula input parameters.
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4.1.2 Filtered Historical Simulation
Rolling-window annualization is used to overcome the problem of too less data
history for VaR calibrations based on Historical Simulation (HS). Alternatively,
VaR calibrations could also carried out on the basis of an underlying model. How-
ever, this approach imposes assumptions about an underlying loss distribution and
is thus often referred to as parametric approach. Filtered Historical Simulation
(FHS) aims to overcome the limitations of both approaches. The methodology was
introduced by Giovanni Barone-Adessi in 1997 and is based on the combination of
parametric GARCH models and non-parametric historical simulation. Historical
data is filtered and subsequently used as basis for the simulation of future return
pathways.
The first step of the FHS is the removal of serial correlation and volatility clusters
from the data. This can be done by an ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(m,n) filter. A time
series rt following an ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model
1 is given by
rt = φ1rt−1 + ψ1ǫt−1 + ǫt (4.3)
σ2t = α0 + α1ǫt−1 + βσ
2
t−1. (4.4)
where σt represents the non constant variance of ǫt. Let s denote the available
amount of daily returns2. Estimating the parameters in equations 4.3 and 4.4
leads to
• a set of estimated returns of length s: {r̂1, r̂2, . . . , r̂s},
• a set of estimated volatility of length s: {σ̂1, σ̂2, . . . , σ̂s},
• a set of estimated residuals of length s: {ǫ̂1, ǫ̂2, . . . , ǫ̂s}.






• a set of standardized residuals of length s: {ẑ1, ẑ2, . . . , ẑs}.
1Without loss of generality we use an ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) with zero mean for exemplary
reasons.
2For simplicity, we assume the data to be available as a series of returns on a daily basis. As
we will see in the following chapter, another pattern is easily conceivable too.
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For the simulation of future returns, initial values for equation 4.3 and equation
4.4 need to be determined. It is reasonable, that the most recent data forecasts
the future better than data lying further in the past. Calling in mind that the
length of the available time series is denoted by s, initial values are determined as
follows
• initial volatility: σ∗s = σ̂s
• initial residual: ǫ∗s = ǫ̂s
Let T denote the length of the future return path. Out of the set of standard-
ized residuals {ẑ1, ẑ2, . . . , ẑs}, T returns are drawn randomly with replacement,
resulting in
• a set of random standardized returns of length T : {z∗s+1, z
∗
s+2, . . . , z
∗
s+T} .
To obtain the innovation forecasts for periods t = (s + 1, s + 2, . . . s + T ), the
random standardized returns are scaled by the corresponding current volatility.
For each period t = s+ 1, s+ 2, . . . s+ T we iteratively calculate
σ2t
∗












Based on the results above, the pathway of future returns can be generated by





for t = s+ 1 and





for the following periods t = s+ 2, . . . s+ T .
To obtain a distribution of future returns, the proceeding described above is now


































[Barone Adesi et al., 1999].
3To obtain reliable results, K should be chosen as a large number.
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4.2 Aggregation of Capital Requirements
4.2.1 Choice of Correlation Coefficient
As described in Chapter 3, CEIOPS/EIOPA recognizes the insufficiency of the
common linear Pearson correlation to cover the correlation structure between fi-
nancial instruments. In its Level 2 Advice [CEIOPS, 2010c], the regulator proposes
the use of tail correlation coefficients instead of linear correlation concepts and ex-
plains two methodologies to calibrate them – the VaR-implied correlation and
the data-cutting correlation. However, CEIOPS/EIOPA does not further spec-
ify which of the two proposed methodologies is used in practice. Nonetheless, in
the calibration report belonging to the fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS5),
CEIOPS/EIOPSA states on this matter that
”[...] in view of the assumed tail dependence of market risks in stressed
situation the correlation analysis was based on ’cutting out’ adequate
subsets of data pairs in order to obtain a measure of the tail correlation
[...]” [CEIOPS, 2010d, p. 346, Article 3.1285].
This statement suggests, that CEIOPS/EIOPA decides upon tail correlation coef-
ficients obtained through the data cutting methodology concerning the risk module
market risk. However correlation calibration approaches concerning market risk’s
sub-module are not explicitly specified.
Assuming the calibration of data-cutting correlation coefficients CEIOPS/EIOPA
does not make a clear statement about the quantile used either. On this matter
it is solely revealed that
”[...] the overall correlation matrix should produce a level of stress
equivalent to a 99.5% VaR event, so each individual pair can be equiv-
alent to significantly less than a 99.5th percentile stress, but still should
be firmly in the tail. The analysis must be subject to sensitivities for
different percentiles, and should be taken as providing an indication of
the correct correlation.” [CEIOPS, 2010d, p. 367, Article 3.1385]
In general, the use of data cutting correlation coefficients contains problems. Per
definition, data-cutting correlation measures the dependency for the specific set of
joint tail observations meaning all those pairs of observations which simultaneously
fall below a certain predefined quantile. Even for large data histories this specific
set of joint tail observations can be extremely small. The correlation coefficient
Chapter 4. Stability of Regulatory Risk Calibrations and its Alternatives 27
solely depends on a minority of data points and could lead to rather unstable esti-
mations of dependency between the two risks. Figure 4.1 illustrates the problem.
It shows a scatter plot of annualized returns extracted from two financial market
indexes4. VaRs for three different confidence levels are marked by red lines. The
respective lines for both indexes construct a box separating the observations the
data-cutting correlation coefficient calibration is based on. The plot shows that
the number of observations falling into the box of the 99.5% confidence level box
is particularly small.
Figure 4.1: Principle of the data-cutting approach to calibrate the correlation
coefficient between two risks.
A possible alternative to the data-cutting correlation approach is given by the
calibration of VaR-implied correlation coefficients. CEIOPS/EIOPA’s Level 2 Ad-
vice concerning correlation calibration shows that the regulator certainly considers
VaR-implied correlation estimates as possible alternative. However, there is no
sign for its actual application.
4In the further course of this thesis we will see, that these two indexes are used by CEIOP-
S/EIOPA to represent the sub-risk module equity.
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4.2.2 Granularity
The risk module market risk is subdivided into seven sub-risk modules where
some of them are further divided into several types or categories. However, in
most cases, CEIOPS/EIOPA relinquishes the use of a more granular analysis.
The sub-risk module equity is divided into two categories which are investigated
separately. The category ”other equity” comprises four different types of equities.
CEIOPS/EIOPA indeed analyzes all five representing indexes of equity risk empir-
ically and derives stress factors for all of them. Correlations between the category
”global equity” and the category ”other equity” are calibrated for each of the
four possible index combinations. However, zhe regulator only yields one stress
factor per equity category and one correlation parameter between ”global equity”
and ”other equity”. Any diversification effects within ”other equity” are thereby
neglected. CEIOPS/EIOPA again is well aware of this matter but is reluctant
towards a more granular analysis. It is stated that
”CEIOPS notes a potential diversification benefit between the other
equity types, but considers it to be low and difficult to calibrate, so
proposes that the standard formula contains no diversification bene-
fit within the other equity sub-module (an implicit correlation of 1).”
[CEIOPS, 2010a, p. 24, Article 3.66].
A similar attitude is adopted concerning the sub-risk module property. Analysis
is carried out for five types of property risk. Notwithstanding, concerning the
influence of property risk to the Basic Solvency Capital Requirement calculated
according to the standard formula, CEIOPS/EIOPA decides that
”No breakdown in different property classes is needed as the histori-
cal values at risk for the different classes do not diverge too much.”
[CEIOPS, 2010a, p. 24, Article 3.66].
The regulators decisions regarding the granularity of market risk’s sub-risk mod-
ules are arguable. The negligence of diversification effects at several points could
cause a distort picture of an insurance or reinsurance situation of risk exposure.
4.3 Excursus: Choice of Risk Measure
Solvency II risk calibrations are subject to the 99.5% Value-at-Risk risk measure.
In financial risk management, the VaR is a popular and widely used risk measure.
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Nonetheless its application is controversial and has been conceptually criticized
from various directions. In 2008, David Einhorn, manager of the Greenlight Cap-
ital Hedgefund described VaR as
”An airbag that works all the time, except when you have a car acci-
dent.” [Einhorn, 2008]
Among other professionals and risk managers, Einhorn accuses VaR to cause a
false sense of security. A popular alternative to the VaR is given by the Expected
Shortfall (ES) which gives an estimation about the size of loss, in case the VaR is
exceeded. On that account, ES is also referred to as Tail VaR (TVaR).
Arguments in favor of ES
The ES entails two popular advantages towards the VaR – ES is a coherent risk
measure and it is not only a measure of location.
The concept of coherence was introduced by [Artzner et al., 1999] and summarizes
four desirable properties of risk measures5.
Translation invariance: For all losses L and all constants a ∈ R it holds that
ρ(L+ a) = ρ(L) + l,
meaning adding or subtracting a deterministic amount l to a financial position
leading to loss L alters the capital required to buffer this loss by exactly the same
amount.
Positive homogeneity : For all losses L and every λ ≥ 0 it holds that
ρ(λL) = λρ(L),
meaning the scale of financial positions do not have an influence on the risk mea-
sure. For example the choice of currency has no influence on positive homogeneous
risk measures.
Monotonicity : For all losses L1, L2 with P (L1 ≤ L2) = 1 it holds that
ρ(L1) ≤ ρ(L2),
meaning financial positions alway leading to higher losses must result in higher
capital requirements.
5The interpretations of the properties described below are based on [Kriele and Wolf, 2012].
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Subadditivity : For all losses L1, L2, it holds that
ρ(L1 + L2) ≤ ρ(L1) + ρ(L2),
meaning the combination of financial positions lead to diversification effects. In
the financial world, diversification means the reduction of the overall risk of a
portfolio by investing in a variety of assets which are not perfectly correlated. A
loss of a financial position can be neutralized by a positive return or at least a less
severe loss of another [Kriele and Wolf, 2012].
The ES fulfills all four axiomes and can thus be considered as coherent risk mea-
sure. However, Appendix A shows that the VaR does fulfill the first three axioms.
However, a simple counterexample implies that VaR is not a subadditiv risk mea-
sure in general. Thus, VaR possibly neglects diversification effects.
Figure 4.2: Differences between the risk measures VaR and ES.
The second advantage of the ES towards the VaR is implied by its definition.
Theoretically, VaR is a quantile of a loss distribution, meaning VaR determines
the loss which will not be exceeded within a pre-specified probability and time
horizon. hus, VaR is a measure of location and does not consider the situation
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beyond this level whereas the ES gives an estimation about the size of this loss
[Acerbi, 2002]. This is illustrated by figure 4.2. The figure shows histograms of two
similar but not identical data sets6. They differ in their behavior in the left tail.
Nonetheless, the VaR is identical for both data sets. By contrast, ES considers
the tail behavior behind the VaR and is therefore more negative for the second
data set.
Arguments in favor of VaR
In the course of the scientific discourse regarding the suitability of certain risk
measures as well as their advantages towards others, the four desirable properties
of risk measures described above have been complemented by the so called axiom
of elicitabilty. As described in section 2.1, risk measures map random variables
or data vectors to a real number. Thus, risk measures are functionals of the
underlying data. In general, a functional is called elicitable if
”it can be defined as the minimizer of a suitable, strictly convex
scoring function.” [Embrechts et al., 2014, p. 17].
Those scoring functions can be used to compare competing forecasts and thus,
to backtest certain risk measures. It can be shown that VaR is an elicitable risk
measure whereas ES is not. The failure of the elicitability axiom is considered as
the reason for the difficulties on finding a suitable backtesting procedure for ES7.
On this behalf [Gneiting, 2011] stated that the lack of elicitability
”may provide a partial explanation for the lack of literature on the
evaluation of CVaR [ES] forecasts, as opposed to quantile or VaR fore-
casts[...]” [Gneiting, 2011, p. 11].
The absence of methodologies for the validation of ES forecast is a crucial disad-
vantage of ES compared to VaR and probably one of the main reasons to prefer
the latter.
A second problem concerning ES is its dependence on the existence of a finite first
moment. According to its definition, ES is based on the expected size of loss in
case VaR is exceeded. Thus, ES does only exist for probability distributions with
finite mean. However, this is not necessarily the case for probability distributions
in general. Especially particularly heavy-tailed distributions tend to an infinite
mean [Ghosh, 2012]. An example could be a Pareto distribution with α = 1.
6Data sets are simulated and comprise 100 observations each
7There is a controversial discussion about the dependence between a lack elicitability and
difficulties in the construction of backtesting procedures. Some articles consider the topic of
elicitability as irrelevant for the choice of risk measure (refer for example to [Acerbi and Szekely,
2014]).
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Regulatory practice
The advantages and disadvantages of both risk measures make room for discussions
concerning their suitability for risk calibrations as part of regulatory frameworks.
While Solvency II sticks to the use of VaR as a risk measure, its Swiss counter-
part Swiss Solvency Test (SST) introduced the use of ES instead [FOPI, 2004].
A similar decision was taken for the International regulatory framework for banks
(Basel III) developed by the Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision [BIS, 2010].
During the development of the Solvency II framework, the topic concerning the
choice of risk measure was addressed at various points. In several official publica-
tions and protocols CEIOPS/EIOPA’s discussed the advantages and disadvantages
of ES and VaR and examined their suitability for the specific needs of Solvency
II8. In 2007 CEIOPS/EIOPA acknowledged the superiority of VaR in comparison
to ES in terms of the Solvency II framework and stated on this matter
However, CEIOPS recognizes that the Commission’s Amended Frame-
work for Consultation continues to support VaR as the risk measure for
the SCR, and that the decision on the appropriate risk measure should
not only be based on theoretical considerations, but also on practical is-
sues. Therefore, CEIOPS believes that the SCR, at least for an initial
implementation of Solvency II, should be based on VaR [...]. [CEIOPS,
2007, p. 16, paragraph 2.31].
8Most of them were published in 2006, refer for example to a publication of the European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Commitee (EIOPC) [EIOPC, 2006]. EIOPC advises the
European Commission in terms of directives on insurance, reinsurance and occupational pensions.
Chapter 5
Empirical Analysis
The previous chapters paid close attention to the standard formula in general
and were specifically concerned with the structure and calibration of the sub-risk
modules equity and property. Chapter 3 described the modular structure of the
aggregation formula, explained regulatory approaches for the calibration of input
parameters and outlined CEIOPS/EIOPA’s results for parameters of equity and
property risk. Chapter 4 addressed stability problems of the standard formula and
discussed possible alternative approaches for its calibration.
In the empirical analysis discussed in this chapter we replicate CEIOPS/EIOPA’s
calibration approach aiming to reproduce the regulator’s results and decisions. In
a second step, we empirically investigate alternative risk calibration approaches
discussed in Chapter 4. The empirical analysis specifically refers to the sub-risk
modules equity risk and property risk and is carried out on authentic data, meaning
financial market indexes chosen by CEIOPS/EIOPA to represent the individual
risk modules1. In most cases, the empirical analysis described in this chapter is
carried out on two different data sets, both built upon the representing indexes.
The first data set includes approximately the same length of historical data as it
is used by CEIOPS/EIOPA. We will further refer to this set of observations as
”original data set”. The second data set simply includes additional, more up to
date data and is thus further referred to as ”recent data set”.
The empirical analysis discussed in this chapter is conducted with the numerical
computing environment [MATLAB, 2015].
1The majority of data is extracted from Bloomberg.
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5.1 Data
For scenario-based approaches like it is applied for equity and property risk calibra-
tions, CEIOPS/EIOPA carries out analysis on historical market data of financial
instruments. In the following, the representing indexes of both sub-risk modules
will be explained in more detail.
5.1.1 Equity Risk
The sub-risk module equity is divided into two categories. The category ”global eq-
uity” is represented by a single index while ”other equity” covers four equity types,
each represented by an individual index. Table 5.1 summarizes CEIOPS/EIOPA’s
choice of indexes representing equity risk. The coverage, initiation and affiliation
of each index will be described below.
Category Equity type Index
Global Global MSCI World Developed Price Equity Index
Other Private Equity LPX50 Total Return Index
Commodities S&P GSCI Total Return Index
Hedge Funds HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index
Emerging Markets MSCI Emerging Markets BRIC
Table 5.1: Indexes representing the two categories of the sub-risk module
equity.
Global equity
• The MSCI World Developed Price Equity Index is traded in US
Dollars and covers instruments across 23 Developed Market (DM) coun-
tries2. The MSCI World was constructed by the American financial services
provider Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). To ensure up-to-
dateness it is reviewed quarterly and thus reflects changes in the underlying
equity markets to all times. The index was launched on March 31, 1986.
Data prior to the launch date is back-tested data [MSCI, 2016b]. We will
further refer to this index as MSCI World or sometimes simply as MSCI.
2Countries involved: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, U.S.
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Other equity
• The LPX50 Total Return Index represents the equity type private equity
and comprises the 50 largest listed private equity companies given they fulfill
certain liquidity constraints. The index is constructed by the LPX Group, a
Swiss financial services provider and is designed with the purpose to ensure
tradability, transparency and investability [Group, 2016]. We will further
refer to this index as LPX50.
• The S&P GSCI Total Return Index represents the equity type com-
modities. It is designed to provide a benchmark for investment performance
on the commodity markets. It is calculated on a world production weighted
basis and comprises the most liquid physical commodity futures. The index
involves five sectors – agriculture, energy, livestock, industrial metals and
precious metals reflecting 24 commodity futures in total. The weight of each
commodity indicates its significance in the world economy given the index
preserves to be tradable. The index was initiated by Goldman Sachs and
has been calculated since 1969. Standard&Poors acquired the index from
Goldman Sachs in 2007 [Standard&Poors, 2012]. We will further refer to
this index as S&P GSCI or sometimes simply as S&P.
• The HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index3 represents the equity type hedge
funds and aims to reflect the overall composition of the hedge fund segment.
It comprises a combintation of all eligible hedge fund strategies weighted
according to their asset distribution in the segment. The index is constructed
by the Hedge Fund Research Inc. (HFR) [Hedge Fund Research, 2014]. We
will further refer to this index as HFRX.
• The MSCI Emerging Market BRIC Index represents the equity type
emerging markets. It is is traded in US Dollars and is designed to measure
the performance of the equity market in four countries – Brazil, Russia,
India, China. Like the MSCI World, the MSCI BRIC is constructed by the
American financial services provider MSCI. It is based on the same quality
standards to ensure global views across all market capitalization segments
of sector, style and size a well as to assure actuality. The MSCI BRIC was
launched on Dec 06, 2005. Data prior to the launch date is back-tested
data [MSCI., 2016a]. We will further refer to this index as MSCI BRIC or
sometimes simply as BRIC.
3In comparison to the other indexes, the HFRX is not extracted from Bloomberg but, after
registration, directly downloaded from the HFR website: https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/
family-indices/hfrx.
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Figure 5.1 shows daily historical prices of the five indexes described above starting
at their individual initiation4.
Figure 5.1: Monthly prices for representing indexes of equity risk.
For equity risk, CEIOPS/EIOPA bases its analysis on index data ending in 2009.
The regulator does not indicate an exact date. We therefore choose the year-end
of 2009 as end date for the ”original data set”. The more recent analysis is carried
out on data ending in September 2015. Table 5.2 summarizes the initiation date
of each index as well as the composition of both data sets.
Original Data Recent Data






LPX50 31.12.1993 4174 5672
S&P GSCI 01.01.1970 10436 11933
HFRX5 31.03.2003 1763 3260
MSCI BRIC 30.12.1994 3915 5412
Table 5.2: Data history of indexes representing equity risk.
4Note that the y-axis is log scaled in order to ensure a better visualization.
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5.1.2 Property Risk
Property risk is represented by index data extracted from the Investment Property
Databank (IPD). The index is provided by IPD Ltd. which was acquired by MSCI
in 2012. According to [CEIOPS, 2010b], it is the most widely used commercial
property index. The IPD indexes are produced for 17 European countries and 7
countries outside Europe in total. They measure total returns for directly held real
estate assets as well as for the four main market sectors retail, office, industrial
and residential. Depending on the country and its conditions, the results can be
more granular [IPD, 2012].
For most countries data are provided annually or quarterly. However, for the
UK market sector, monthly closing prices are available and therewith provide the
greatest pool of available data within the databank. CEIOPS/EIOPA therefore
decided to carry out analysis on the Monthly IPD UK Total Return Index.
The UK property market sector is represented by six individual indexes. How-
ever, CEIOPS/EIOPA only defines five categories to carry out individual analysis.
For the category ’commercial’ it is not automatically perceptible which UK IPD
index is used [CEIOPS, 2010b]. Table 5.3 summarized the five defined property
categories together with the six available UK IPD indexes.
Categories Index
All properties UK IPD UK Total Return ’All Property’
Offices UK excl. London city IPD UK Total Return ’Offices’
Offices London city IPD UK Total Return ’City Offices’
Retail UK IPD UK Total Return ’Retail’
Commercial UK
IPD UK Total Return ’Industry’
IPD UK Total Return ’Warehouse’
Table 5.3: Indexes representing the sub-risk module property.
All six indexes representing property risk were initiated simultaneously in Decem-
ber 1986. For regulatory analysis carried out on those indexes, CEIOPS/EIOPA
makes clear statements about the length as well as the end date of the data set.
Those specifications are however inconclusive. Two possible original data sets are
conceivable. Table 5.4 summarizes initiation date, end date and length of time
series for those two possible original data sets as well as the recent data.
5HFRX includes several missing values (66 for original data and 11 for recent data).
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31.07.2008 31.12.2008 Recent Data Set
Index Initiation End Length End Length End Length
UK IPD 31.12.1986 31.12.2008 264 31.07.2008 259 29.02.2016 351
Table 5.4: Data history of indexes representing property risk.
Figure 5.2 shows the historical development of the six UK IPD indexes between
1986 and the beginning of 2016.
Figure 5.2: Monthly prices for representing indexes of property risk.
5.2 Replication of CEIOPS/EIOPA’s Approach
The first step of the empirical analysis described in this chapter is the replication
of CEIOPS/EIOPA’s approach to calibrate standard formula input parameters for
equity and property risk. To overcome the lack of sufficient annual returns, the
regulator applies one-year rolling-windows to transform daily prices into annual-
ized returns. For the first part of the analysis we base our calibrations on returns
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generated by the same technique. Histograms of the resulting rolling-window an-
nualized returns can be found in Appendix B.
5.2.1 Stress Scenarios
Equity risk
Although reporting only one stress factor per equity category in their Level 2
Advice, CEIOPS/EIOPA carries out analysis on each of the five indexes described
above. Table 5.5 summarizes the regulator’s results for VaR calibrations together
with the final proposed stress factors for the two categories and compares them
to the outcomes of our replication study carried out on both data sets described
above.
Regulator Replication
Empirical Final Original Data Recent Data




S&P GSCI −59.45% −59.66% −59.21%
HFRX −23.11% −23.18% −22.80%
MSCI BRIC −63.83% −63.90% −61.43%
Table 5.5: Replicative VaR calibrations for indexes representing equity risk.
The outcomes of the replicative analysis are very similar to the regulator’s results.
Minor differences between CEIOPS/EIOPA’s results and the replicative analysis
carried out on the original data set could result from small differences in the length
of data history since the regulator does not state the exact end date of the used
time series.
Property risk
For the sub-risk module property, CEIOPS/EIOPA intially carries out analysis on
6 indexes. As stated above, the regulator’s statements concerning the number of
observations and the end date are inconclusive. The replication study reveals, that
both conceivable data sets do not fit to the regulator’s empirical VaR calibrations
results. Via trial and error we find a data set where our outcomes of the replication
study fit well to CEIOPS/EIOPA’s results. Table 5.5 summarizes the calibration
results based on all three original data sets as well as recent data and compares
them to regulatory outcomes.
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Regulator Replication
Empirical Final 31.07.2008 31.12.2008 30.03.2009 Recent
All property −25.74%
−25%
−15.18% −2158% −25.72% −26.23%
Offices −25.93% −15.11% −22.50% −26.06% −26.56%
City Offices −30.03% −24.41% −27.27% −30.73% −30.68%
Retail −27.47% −16.20% −22.11% −27.30% −27.95%
Industry
−27.67%
−13.58% −19.17% −21.55% −21.86%
Warehouse −19.02% −23.84% −28.07% −28.30%
Table 5.6: Replicative VaR calibrations for indexes representing property risk.
According to the results in table 5.5 we assume that the category commercial is
represented by the index for warehouse. Replicative VaR calibrations fit signifi-
cantly better for this index in comparison to the index for industry.
5.2.2 Correlation
For the sub-risk module equity, CEIOPS/EIOPA proposes final stress factors for
two equity categories. The aggregation of those two categories requires a param-
eter measuring the correlation between them. Similar to the stress calibration,
regulatory analysis is carried out on all five indexes meaning CEIOPS/EIOPA
calibrates a correlation parameter between the MSCI World representing ”global
equity” and each index representing ”other equity”. However, only an ”average”










Table 5.7: Regulatory tail correlation coefficients between the MSCI World
representing ”global equity” and each of the representative indexes of the cate-
gory ”other equity”.
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In the following we replicate CEIOPS/EIOPA’s analysis on correlation within the
risk-module equity6.
Data-cutting correlation
As described in Chapter 3, CEIOPS/EIOPA reveals the use of the data-cutting
approach for the risk module market risk [CEIOPS, 2010d]. Figure 5.3 illustrates
the functionality of this approach. It shows scatter plots of each of the four
possible combinations of ”global equity” and ”other equity”. The red boxes in
the diagrams are composed of the VaR for the MSCI World and the VaR of the
respective representative for ”other equity” for a certain confidence interval, here
1 − α1 = 0.995, 1 − α2 = 0.95 and 1 − α3 = 0.9. The data points located in the
particular box illustrate the data ’cutted out’, meaning the data points considered
for the calibration of the data-cutting correlation coefficient estimate.
Figure 5.3: Relationship between the MSCI World and each representative of
”other equity” including data-cutting boxes for exemplary percentiles.
6Note that at this point of the study we focus on equity risk. For the sub-risk module property,
there is no further breakdown into sub-categories. Hence, CEIOPS/ EIOPA does not carry out
any analysis concerning correlation in this risk module.
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Assuming data-cutting correlation calibrations within equity risk, the regulator
does not disclose the confidence level, the calibrations are based on. We therefore
calibrate data-cutting correlation coefficients between the MSCI World and the
four indexes representing ”other equity” for various confidence levels. A range of
results for both data sets is summarized in table 5.8.
LPX50 S&P GSCI HFRX MSCI BRIC
1 − α Original Recent Original Recent Original Recent Original Recent
0.995 0.7758 0.8624 0.3253 0.2506 NaN NaN 0.0225 0.2722
0.99 0.7881 0.5974 0.2594 0.3894 NaN −0.1829 0.3437 0.34
0.98 0.6445 0.6225 0.2708 0.1475 −0.1829 −0.1655 0.1511 0.2352
0.97 0.5606 0.6445 −0.2696 −0.2675 −0.3448 0.3171 0.3473 0.5089
0.96 0.624 0.7999 −0.306 −0.2716 −0.1655 0.3934 0.5091 0.4088
0.95 0.7623 0.8739 −0.2457 −0.0946 0.0734 0.4864 0.4467 0.4395
0.90 0.9222 0.9386 0.4695 0.5071 0.4864 0.9199 0.7495 0.871
0.85 0.9334 0.9123 0.6126 0.668 0.8544 0.9587 0.8849 0.9122
0.80 0.9183 0.8815 0.6361 0.6245 0.9322 0.9514 0.9045 0.8798
Table 5.8: Data-cutting correlation coefficients for varying confidence levels
based on rolling-window annualized returns of indexes representing equity risk.
For most indexes the data-cutting correlation coefficients subject to the different
confidence levels vary widely. Table 5.8 also reveals, that we cannot calibrate
a data-cutting correlation coefficient for the HFRX when the confidence level is
particularly small. For those confidence levels we do not find enough observations
falling simultaneously below the confidence level. This could be reasoned by the
relatively short data history of the index.
Figure 5.4 graphically shows the behavior of the data-cutting correlation coeffi-
cients over varying confidence levels for each of the four indexes. The black dashed
line implies the correlation coefficient calibrated by CEIOPS/EIOPA.
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Figure 5.4: Behavior of data-cutting correlation estimates over varying confi-
dence levels based on annualized returns of indexes representing equity risk.
Except for the HFRX, there are only minor differences between original and recent.
The non-accordance for this index could again be explained by its short data
history and the resulting relative difference between the original and the recent
data set. For the MSCI BRIC we cannot find a match with CEIOPS/EIOPA’s
calibration result. For the remaining indexes there are matches. Nonetheless we
cannot identify a coincident confidence level for them.
VaR-implied correlation
In its Level 2 Advice, CEIOPS/EIOPA also takes the VaR-implied correlation
calibration methodology into consideration. Similar to the data-cutting analysis
we calibrate VaR-implied correlation coefficients over varying confidence levels and
for both data sets. Table 5.9 summarizes the results.
LPX50 S&P GSCI HFRX MSCI BRIC
α Original Recent Original Recent Original Recent Original Recent
0.995 1 1 0.831 0.8249 1 1 1 1
0.99 1 1 0.7759 0.8259 1 1 1 1
0.98 1 1 0.6221 0.5426 1 1 1 1
0.97 1 1 0.2509 0.1024 1 1 1 1
0.96 1 1 −0.0985 −0.2024 1 1 1 0.7551
0.95 1 1 −0.1275 −0.293 1 1 0.9487 0.6311
0.90 1 1 −0.5226 −0.3491 1 −0.0452 0.5485 0.355
0.85 1 1 −0.7641 −0.6205 1 0.2679 0.5491 1
0.80 1 1 −0.9559 −0.9645 1 1 1 1
Table 5.9: VaR-implied correlation coefficients for varying confidence levels
based on rolling-window annualized returns of indexes representing equity risk.
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For the LPX50, the VaR-implied correlation is constantly 1. The HFRX and the
MSCI BRIC exhibit perfect correlations for numerous confidence levels, too. The
results for the S&P GSCI vary extremely.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the result in comparison to CEIOPS/EIOPA’s calibration
result, again visualized by a dashed black line.
Figure 5.5: Behavior of VaR-implied correlation estimates over varying confi-
dence levels based on annualized returns of indexes representing equity risk.
Figure 5.5 reveals that for the data used by the regulator, only the S&P GSCI
exhibits a match with CEIOPS/EIOPA’s empirical correlation coefficient.
Pearson Correlation
As discussed at several points, CEIOPS/EIOPA acknowledges the insufficiency
of common linear correlation coefficients to fully reflect the dependence structure
between risks. However, for the sake of completeness, we additionally calibrate the
Pearson correlation coefficient between the MSCI World and the representative
indexes of ”other equity”. Table 5.10 shows the results for both data sets in
comparison to regulatory (tail) correlation calibration results.
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Regulator Replication




S&P GSCI 0.4472 0.0653 0.0825
HFRX 0.7731 0.9664 0.9433
MSCI BRIC −0.5282 0.6950 0.6660
Table 5.10: Linear Pearson correlation coefficients between ”global equity”
and each representing index of the equity category other.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the LPX50 and the MSCI world is close
to the result CEIOPS/EIOPA obtained. The others however differ considerably.
5.3 VaR based on FHS Annual Returns
Chapter 4 explained the possibility of severe distortions caused by the use of
rolling-window annualized returns as basis for historical risk calibrations. The
chapter also introduced Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) as an alternative sim-
ulation approach. In this part of the empirical study we examine the application
of FHS to gather a sufficient amount of annual data as basis for risk calibrations
concerning the sub-risk modules equity and property. Our analysis is carried out
according to a variation of the FHS approach described by [Barone Adesi et al.,
1999]. The algorithm is given by





, t = 1, . . . , s− 1 (5.1)
where Pwt denotes the closing price of the last trading day in week t and
s refers to the amount of weeks available in the data. Respectively, for




, t = 1, . . . , s− 1 (5.2)
Here, Pt denotes the closing price of month t while s represents the length
of the concerning price index.
7Weekly returns are chosen since those returns ca be aggregated to yearly data more easily
as it would be the case with weekly returns.
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2. Fit ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(1,1) models with p,q ∈ {0, 1, 2} to each return
series. Choose the best model via AIC/BIC criteria8.
3. On the basis of the standardized model residuals randomly with replacement
draw 100,000 subsets of length 52 and use them to generate pathways of
future returns.






(r∗j,i + 1)− 1 j = 1, . . . 100000
with p = 52 for indexes representing equity risk and p = 12 for representa-
tives of property risk.
5. On the basis of the set of future non-overlapping annual returns build boot-
strap samples and calibrate 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of estimates
for the 99.5% VaR.
5.3.1 Calibration Results
According to the algorithm described above we carried out analysis on all indexes
representing equity risk and property risk. For equity risk, we analyze the original
as well as th recent data. For property risk, we limit the analysis to recent data9.
For each index, ARMA-GARCH models are fitted with two different assumptions
concerning the distribution of ǫt.
Equity risk
For each of the two data sets we choose the best models via AIC/BIC criteria, one
of them referring to the best model assuming normal distribution for ǫt while the
other represents the best model assuming student-t distributed ǫt. VaR calibration
results based on FHS annual returns obtained from those models are summarized
in table 5.11.
8In case AIC/BIC criteria are inconclusive, choose in favor of the model with lower order.
9Results for the original data set appear to be highly unstable. Adding or excluding a minor
number of observations to the investigated data set changed the result to a high degree.
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Index Data ǫt Model 95% CI for VaR99.5 AIC BIC
MSCI
Original
∼ N (0, 0) [−41.28%,−39.32%] −1.0248 −1.0225
∼ t (0, 0) [−40.33%,−38.85%] −1.0322 −1.0294
Recent
∼ N (0, 0) [−43.38%,−41.48%] −1.1755 −1.1732
∼ t (0, 0) [−40.82%,−39.26%] −1.1842 −1.1813
LPX50
Original
∼ N (1, 2) [−81.91%,−79.40%] −3.7951 −3.7668
∼ t (1, 2) [−80.71%,−78.04%] −3.8354 −3.8023
Recent
∼ N (0, 0) [−74.51%,−71.09%] −5.1414 −5.1212
∼ t (2, 0) [−67.96%,−65.65%] −5.2209 −5.1857
S&P
Original
∼ N (0, 0) [−48.68%,−47.14%] −9.8338 −9.8112
∼ t (0, 0) [−49.87%,−48.38%] −9.866 −9.8378
Recent
∼ N (0, 0) [−44.01%,−42.19%] −1.1194 −1.1171
∼ t (0, 0) [−45.05%,−43.19%] −1.1244 −1.1215
HFRX
Original
∼ N (0, 0) [−14.97%,−13.89%] −2.5596 −2.5442
∼ t (1, 1) [−25.76%,−24.39%] −2.597 −2.5699
Recent
∼ N (1, 1) [−20.80%,−20.01%] −4.8823 −4.8554
∼ t (1, 1) [−22, 00%,−21.43%] −4.9375 −4.9062
BRIC
Original
∼ N (0, 0) [−64.18%,−61.93%] −2.9551 −2.9365
∼ t (0, 0) [−68.33%,−65.76%] −2.987 −2.9645
Recent
∼ N (2, 0) [−61.34%,−59.64%] −4.248 −4.2281
∼ t (0, 0) [−68.04%,−65.86%] −4.2985 −4.2636
Table 5.11: Results for VaR calibrations based on annual returns obtained
through filtered historical simulation for sub-risk module equity.
Again based on AIC/BIC criteria, we decide between the model assuming a normal
distribution for ǫt and the model based on the assumption of student-t distributed
ǫt. For all indexes representing equity risk, models assuming student-t distribution
for ǫt appear to be the preferred models. In table 5.12 we compare the final
model with CEIOPS/EIOPA’s results for empirical VaR calibrations as well as
our replication results.
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FHS Rolling Window





















Table 5.12: VaR calibration results based on FHS annual returns vs. original
and replicative results for calculations on the basis of rolling-window annual
returns for indexes representing equity risk.
For the MSCI World and the S&P GSCI, the calibration results unequivocally
imply an overestimation of risk by CEIOPS/EIOPA’s approach. The same applies
to the recent data sets of the LPX50 and the HFRX. However, the MSCI BRIC as
well as the original data of the LPX50 exhibit more negative results for calibrations
based on FHS annual returns.
Property risk
Table 5.13 summarizes VaR calibration results for the best models fitted to indexes
representing property risk.
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Index Data ǫt Model 95% CI for VaR99.5 AIC BIC
All prop. Recent
∼ N (2, 2) [−6.72%,−6.06%] −2.9621 −2.9312
∼ t (1, 1) [−9.16%,−8.11%] −2.9963 −2.9693
Offices Recent
∼ N (1, 1) [−10.58%,−9.51%] −2.8384 −2.8153
∼ t (1, 1) [−10.53%,−9.25%] −2.8733 −2.8463
City off. Recent
∼ N (2, 2) [−9.29%,−8.51%] −2.3912 −2.3603
∼ t (1, 1) [−7.41%,−6.67%] −2.4555 −2.4285
Retail Recent
∼ N (1, 1) [−6.95%,−6.36%] −2.9046 −2.8815
∼ t (1, 1) [−6.50%,−5.93%] −2.9285 −2.9015
Warehouse Recent
∼ N (1, 1) [−5.17%,−4.54%] −2.6579 −2.6347
∼ t (1, 1) [−7.31%,−6.49%] −2.7194 −2.6924
Table 5.13: Results for VaR calibrations based on annual returns obtained
through filtered historical simulation for sub-risk module property
Here, too, the assumption of student-t distribution is superior to models assum-
ing normal distribution for ǫt. Table 5.14 compares the VaR calibration results
based on FHS annual returns obtained through the preferred models to CEIOP-
S/EIOPA’s empirical calibration results.
FHS Rolling Window
Index Data 95% CI for VaR99.5 Replication Regulator
All prop. Recent [−9.16%,−8.11%] −25.74% −26.23%
Offices Recent [−10.53%,−9.25%] −25.93% 26.56%
City off. Recent [−7.41%,−6.67%] −30.03% −30.68%
Retail Recent [−6.50%,−5.93%] −27.47% −27.95%
Warehouse Recent [−7.31%,−6.49%] −27.67% −28.30%
Table 5.14: VaR calibration results based on FHS annual returns vs. original
and replicative results for calculations on the basis of rolling-window annual
returns for indexes representing property risk.
VaR calibrations based on FHS annual returns clearly reveal an overestimation
of risk by the regulatory rolling-window approach. We obtain deviations from
CEIOPS/EIOPA’s empirical results accounting to 15 to 20 percent.
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5.3.2 Diagnostics and Limitations
For property risk, we renounced the reporting of outcomes obtained from analysis
carried out on the original data sets. Calibration results reacted extremely volatile
to minor changes in the length of time series. The recent data behaves more
stable. However, since the UK IPD Property Index is only provided on a monthly
basis, both data sets have a relatively short data history. Indexes representing
equity risk are daily available and therewith exhibit a longer history. However,
in comparison to the other four representatives of equity risk, the time series for
HFRX is significantly shorter.
Besides problems concerning the amount of historical observations, the indexes
analyzed in this study exhibit some characteristics which complicate profound
analyses and conclusions. In this section we will look into the sample moments of
weekly as well as FHS annual returns for each index. Further, we will discuss two
difficulties encountered in the course of fitting ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(1,1) models.
Moments
The first four sample moments are given by mean, standard deviation, skewness
and kurtosis. Skewness measures the asymmetry of the data around the sample
mean. Kurtosis looks into the tails of the distribution and measures the sample’s
outlier-sensibility. The skewness of a normal distribution is zero while its kurtosis
is 3. Table 5.15 summarizes the four described moments of weekly returns in
comparison to FHS annual returns for indexes representing equity risk.
Equity: Original Data
Index Return Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
MSCI
weekly 0.0014 0.0204 −0.7268 11.368
FHS 0.0693 0.1613 0.0765 4.4537
LPX
weekly 0.0015 0.0326 −1.0481 12.7299
FHS 0.0792 0.3068 0.6517 7.249
S&P
weekly 0.0022 0.026 −0.4489 6.7476
FHS 0.1227 0.2492 0.9405 8.3531
HFRX
weekly 0.0004 0.0075 −2.3527 15.52
FHS 0.0422 0.0861 −0.786 6.0586
BRIC
weekly 0.0023 0.0403 −0.3957 7.1007
FHS 0.1523 0.3189 0.3685 4.5555
Table 5.15: Mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis for for weekly as
well as FHS annual returns of indexes representing equity risk: Original data.
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Equity: Recent Data
Index Return Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
MSCI
weekly 0.0014 0.0204 −0.6929 10.4743
FHS 0.0658 0.1618 0.074 4.3494
LPX
weekly 0.002 0.031 −1.0058 12.2782
FHS 0.0792 0.3068 0.6517 7.249
S&P
weekly 0.0017 0.0259 −0.4588 6.4825
FHS 0.0926 0.2103 0.6276 6.6992
HFRX
weekly 0.0003 0.0065 −2.1576 15.455
FHS 0.0056 0.0704 −0.4629 4.131
BRIC
weekly 0.0014 0.0375 −0.338 7.3336
FHS 0.0742 0.2772 0.4489 4.5882
Table 5.16: Mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis for for weekly
as well as FHS annual returns of indexes representing equity risk: Recent data.
Table 5.15 and table 5.16 imply that FHS annual returns are ”more normal” than
weekly returns. For the majority of indexes, the skewness of FHS annual returns
is closer to zero than it is for weekly data. Also, the kurtosis reduces for almost all
indexes when moving from weekly to FHS annual returns. An exception is solely
given by the S&P GSCI. Here, skewness and kurtosis are slightly higher for FHS
annual returns.
Moments of monthly returns in comparison FHS annual returns for indexes rep-
resenting property risk are shown in table 5.17. The moments summarized in
table 5.17 do not generally imply a ”normalization” of data when moving from
weekly to FHS annual returns. The results for skewness are diverse. Some in-
dexes exhibit a decrease in skewness while others seem to become more skew.
The kurtosis increases for all five indexes and literally explodes for warehouse and
all property. Remembering the course of the time series illustrated in figure 5.2,
a possible explanation could be the short data history in combination with the
extreme variations of prices within a short time period.
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Property: Recent Data
Index Return Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
All property
weekly 0.0074 0.0107 −1.7173 10.1969
FHS 0.0474 0.1058 4.6851 152.086
Offices
weekly 0.0073 0.0119 −1.3619 7.8432
FHS 0.0536 0.0982 1.2397 22.681
City Offices
weekly 0.006 0.0157 −1.5011 8.7655
FHS 0.104 0.0616 0.8828 10.5438
Retail
weekly 0.0069 0.0109 −1.7716 11.5282
FHS 0.0354 0.089 2.4166 46.4059
Warehouse
weekly 0.0088 0.013 −1.3066 9.3049
FHS 0.0883 0.0562 10.4302 906.1114
Table 5.17: The first four moments mean, standard deviation, skewness and
kurtosis for weekly as well as FHS annual returns of indexes property risk.
iGARCH effects
Per model definition, the parameters of ARMA-GARCH models are required to
meet specific conditions. One of them requires the sum of the ARCH and GARCH
parameters to be less than 1, that is
∑max(m,s)
i=1 (αi+βi) < 1. If the condition is not
fulfilled, the unconditional variance of the innovation at approaches infinity. Weak
stationarity is not longer given. The phenomenon of the GARCH parameters
summing up to 1 is called integrated GARCH (iGARCH) effect. Those iGARCH
effects are likely to have spuriously impact on volatility forecasts [Franke et al.,
2015].
Table 5.18 gives an overview of iGARCH effects detected10 for ARMA-GARCH
fits of data representing equity risk. The table shows, that models fitted for the
LPX50 cumulatively exhibit iGARCH effects when assuming normal distribution
for ǫt. The remaining models seem to be free of those effects.
10Affected models identified by [MATLAB, 2015].
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Equity: Original Data Equity: Recent Data
MSCI LPX S&P HFRX BRIC MSCI LPX S&P HFRX BRIC
nv t nv t nv t nv t nv t nv t nv t nv t nv t nv t
(0,0) - - x - - - - - - - - - x - - - - - - -
(0,1) - - x - - - - - - - - - x - - - - - - -
(0,2) - - x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(1,0) - - x - - - - - - - - - x - - - - - - -
(1,1) - - x - - - - - - - - - x - - - - - - -
(1,2) - - x - - - - - - - - - x - - - - - - -
(2,0) - - - - - - - - - - - - x - - - - - - -
(2,1) - - x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(2,2) - - x - - - - - - - - - x - - - - - - -
Table 5.18: Present iGARCH effects for ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(1,1) models
fitted for indexes representing the sub-risk module equity.
Table 5.19 shows the same reports for ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(1,1) fitted to indexes
representing the sub-risk module property.
Property: Recent Data
All prop. Offices City off. Retail Wareh.
nv t nv t nv t nv t nv t
(0, 0) x x x x x x x x x x
(0, 1) x - x x - x x x x -
(0, 2) x x x x - x x x x x
(1, 0) x x x x - x - - x x
(1, 1) x x - x - - - x x -
(1, 2) x - x x x - - x - x
(2, 0) x x - - - - - x - x
(2, 1) - - x - x x - x - x
(2, 2) x x x x x x - x x -
Table 5.19: Present iGARCH effects for ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(1,1) models
fitted for indexes representing the sub-risk module property.
According to table 5.19 the majority of models is affected by iGARCH effects.
This includes most of the models chosen as best fits.
Pole-zero cancellation
Both models chosen for the original data of the LPX50 exhibit so called pole-zero
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cancellation. To understand this phenomenon, consider an ARMA(1,1) model11
given by
yt = φ1yt−1 + ψ1ǫt−1 + ǫt. (5.3)





If φ1 = −ψ1, yt reduces to a white noise given by
yt = ǫt. (5.5)
Thus, the ARMA(1,2) model reduces to an ARMA(0,0) [Verbeek, 2001]. This
effect is referred to as pole-zero cancellation.
For the original data of the LPX50 we chose ARMA(1,1) models for both assump-
tions concerning the distribution of ǫt. With φ1 = 0.768521 and ψ1 = −0762193
assuming normal distribution for ǫt and φ1 = 0.781838 and ψ1 = −0.780076 as-
suming student-t distributed ǫt, both best models exhibit pole-zero cancellation.
Allowing for this effect, the models reduce to ARMA(0,1) models.
Table 5.20 compares VaR calibration results for the final model with the outcomes
for the reduced model. For the sake of completeness, the results for the unaffected
recent data set is included.
FHS Rolling Window






Recent (1, 2) [−67.96%,−65.65%] −67.50%
Table 5.20: Comparison between VaR calibration results of final model and
calibration outcomes of the reduced model when allowing for pole-zero canella-
tion.
Allowing for pole-zero cancellation, VaR calibrations based on FHS anual returns
would rather imply an overestimation of risk by the regulatory approach.
11For exemplary purposes, we assume the constant parameter φ0 equals zero.
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5.4 Correlation based on FHS Annual Returns
[Mittnik, 2011] clearly showed, that the application of rolling-windows not only
affects results of VaR calibrations. It also distorts the dependence structure be-
tween risks. In this section, we analyze the correlation between the two equity
categories ”global equity” and ”other equity” based on annual returns obtained
via FHS. To simulate FHS annual returns suitable for correlation calibrations, we
use a slightly modified FHS algorithm12.
1. Transform daily prices into weekly returns.
2. Fit ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(1,1) models with p,q ∈ {0, 1, 2} to each return
series. Choose the best model via AIC/BIC criteria13.
3. Simultaneously, randomly with replacement draw pairs of residuals com-
posed of a residual of time t from the best model for the MSCI World and
a residual of the same time t from the best model for one of the indexes
representing ”other equity”. Based on the resulting 100, 000 subsets of pairs
with length 52 generate 100,000 pathways of pairs of future returns.
4. Aggregate the pathways to non-overlapping pairs of annual returns.
5. Build bootstrap samples and calibrate the 95% bootstrap confidence interval
for the correlation coefficient bootstrap estimate.
Based on annual FHS data obtained via the algorithm above, we calibrate 95%
bootstrap confidence intervals for correlation coefficients based on the data-cutting
approach, the VaR-implied correlation approach and Pearson correlation.
Data-cutting correlation
Table 5.21 and table 5.22 show the results for bootstrap confidence intervals of
correlation coefficients obtained via the data-cutting approach. Again, analysis is
carried out on original data as well as the recent data set.
12For familiar reasons, we again focus on equity risk. The algorithm is accordingly tailored to
characteristics of data representing this risk module.
13The best models are obviously the same as in the previous FHS study for VaR calibrations,
since we use the same data.
Chapter 5. Empirical Analysis 56
Original Data
1 − α LPX50 S&P GSCI HFRX BRIC
0.995 [−0.0017, 0.3232] [−0.9735, 0.9990] [−0.1132, 0.2266] [−0.0792, 0.2925]
0.99 [0.1870, 0.3648] [−0.3867, 0.3983] [0.0551, 0.2652] [0.0398, 0.2852]
0.98 [0.2631, 0.3938] [−0.1389, 0.2194] [0.1063, 0.2732] [0.1411, 0.2911]
0.97 [0.3026, 0.4047] [−0.2088, 0.0943] [0.1728, 0.2969] [0.1804, 0.3068]
0.96 [0.3084, 0.4035] [−0.1295, 0.1100] [0.2371, 0.3437] [0.1862, 0.2900]
0.95 [0.3307, 0.4150] [−0.0696, 0.1165] [0.2612, 0.3458] [0.2034, 0.2991]
0.90 [0.4198, 0.4757] [−0.0181, 0.0869] [0.3408, 0.4025] [0.2839, 0.3398]
0.85 [0.4549, 0.4935] [0.0191, 0.0879] [0.3863, 0.4333] [0.3061, 0.3526]
0.80 [0.4647, 0.5003] [0.0420, 0.1073] [0.4134, 0.4573] [0.3190, 0.3651]
Table 5.21: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for data-cutting correlation
coefficients between ”global equity” and ”other equity” based on FHS annual
returns of original data.
Recent Data
1 − α LPX50 S&P GSCI HFRX BRIC
0.995 [0.0536, 0.3828] [−0.4511, 0.9416] [0.0618, 0.3486] [0.1037, 0.5131]
0.99 [0.1929, 0.3976] [−0.1413, 0.6725] [0.2038, 0.4298] [0.1709, 0.4383]
0.98 [0.3288, 0.4666] [−0.1127, 0.4167] [0.2913, 0.4328] [0.2395, 0.4031]
0.97 [0.3406, 0.4552] [−0.1024, 0.2268] [0.3094, 0.4191] [0.2925, 0.4047]
0.96 [0.3585, 0.4594] [−0.0652, 0.2073] [0.3360, 0.4277] [0.2715, 0.3736]
0.95 [0.3598, 0.4539] [−0.0669, 0.1574] [0.3571, 0.4420] [0.2754, 0.3683]
0.90 [0.4237, 0.4902] [0.0062, 0.1125] [0.4433, 0.4981] [0.3272, 0.3933]
0.85 [0.4543, 0.5024] [0.0590, 0.1396] [0.4964, 0.5374] [0.3604, 0.4143]
0.80 [0.4823, 0.5238] [0.0480, 0.1085] [0.5324, 0.5658] [0.3703, 0.4147]
Table 5.22: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for data-cutting correlation
coefficients between ”global equity” and ”other equity” based on FHS annual
returns of recent data.
For small confidence levels α the 95% bootstrap confidence interval are conspicu-
ously wide, implying rather unstable data-cutting correlation coefficients for the
bootstrap samples. This is specifically noticeable for original data of the S&P
GSCI and (1 − α) = 0.995. The 95% bootstrap confidence interval almost spans
the interval of possible values for correlation coefficients.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the course of the data-cutting correlation coefficients with
varying confidence levels and compares them to the corresponding data-cutting
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correlation coefficients calibrated on the basis of rolling-window annualized re-
turns. For the visualization in figure 5.6, we used the median data-cutting cor-
relation coefficient bootstrap estimate. CEIOPS/EIOPA’s calibration results are
indicated by a dashed black line.
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Figure 5.6: Data-cutting correlation based on FHS annual returns in compar-
ison to results of calibrations based on rolling-window annual returns.
Except for the MSCI BRIC, the median correlation coefficient estimates are clearly
below the regulator’s correlation calibration outcome. Also, the course of the
median data-cutting correlation coefficients based on FHS annual data seems to
be more stable in comparison to coefficients calibrated on the basis of rolling-
window annualized returns. Nonetheless, the width of the bootstrap confidence
intervals should be kept in mind.
VaR-implied correlation
Table 5.23 contains the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for VaR-implied cor-
relation analysis carried out on FHS annual returns.
Original Data
1 − α LPX50 S&P GSCI HFRX BRIC
0.995 [0.6484, 0.7272] [−0.1354,−0.0750] [0.6058, 0.7197] [0.4884, 0.5672]
0.99 [0.6825, 0.7435] [−0.1154,−0.0628] [0.6209, 0.7126] [0.5483, 0.6093]
0.98 [0.6201, 0.6781] [−0.1119,−0.0746] [0.6586, 0.7308] [0.5217, 0.5809]
0.97 [0.6145, 0.6617] [−0.1256,−0.0912] [0.6483, 0.7088] [0.5238, 0.5709]
0.96 [0.6179, 0.6575] [−0.1387,−0.0992] [0.6899, 0.7429] [0.5239, 0.5693]
0.95 [0.6254, 0.6653] [−0.1552,−0.1158] [0.7054, 0.7623] [0.5240, 0.5709]
0.90 [0.6025, 0.6449] [−0.2513,−0.2111] [0.6907, 0.7544] [0.5142, 0.5614]
0.85 [0.5491, 0.5955] [−0.4120,−0.3665] [0.6564, 0.7233] [0.4814, 0.5355]
0.80 [0.4467, 0.5202] [−0.6598,−0.6064] [0.5023, 0.6380] [0.3783, 0.4485]
Table 5.23: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for VaR-implied correlation
coefficients between ”global equity” and ”other equity” based on FHS annual
returns of original data.
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Recent Data
1 − α LPX50 S&P GSCI HFRX BRIC
0.995 [0.6549, 0.7448] [−0.0387, 0.0193] [0.6623, 0.7366] [0.599, 0.6723]
0.99 [0.6804, 0.7461] [−0.0070, 0.0551] [0.7605, 0.8370] [0.5985, 0.6580]
0.98 [0.6664, 0.7214] [−0.0034, 0.0392] [0.8045, 0.8577] [0.6035, 0.6583]
0.97 [0.6767, 0.7307] [−0.0121, 0.0345] [0.7981, 0.8498] [0.5944, 0.6406]
0.96 [0.6640, 0.7099] [−0.0244, 0.0166] [0.7971, 0.8513] [0.5930, 0.6428]
0.95 [0.6489, 0.7018] [−0.0526,−0.0103] [0.7637, 0.8127] [0.581, 0.6199]
0.90 [0.6294, 0.6723] [−0.1386,−0.1010] [0.8052, 0.8500] [0.5807, 0.6207]
0.85 [0.5680, 0.6225] [−0.2591,−0.2108] [0.7900, 0.8398] [0.5626, 0.6093]
0.80 [0.5045, 0.5645] [−0.4876,−0.4281] [0.7693, 0.8228] [0.4755, 0.5338]
Table 5.24: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for VaR-implied correlation
coefficients between ”global equity” and ”other equity” based on FHS annual
returns of recent data.
In comparison to the bootstrap confidence intervals for the data-cutting approach,
the span of bootstrap confidence intervals for VaR-implied correlation coefficient
estimates are considerably lower. The size of the bootstrap confidence interval
seems to be approximately constant over varying confidence levels.
Again, we visualize the course of the median VaR-implied correlation coefficient es-
timates with varying confidence levels and compare them to the regulator’s results
as well as VaR-implied correlation calibration outcomes based on rolling-window
annualized returns. Figure 5.7 shows the results.
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Figure 5.7: VaR-implied correlation based on FHS annual returns in compar-
ison to results of calibrations based on rolling-window annual returns.
For the VaR-implied correlation approach too, the course of the median correlation
coefficient estimate seems to be more stable than results for calibrations based on
rolling-window annualized returns. Correlations for the LPX50 as well as the S&P
GSCI are considerably lower than the regulator’s result.
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Pearson correlation
For the sake of completeness, table 5.25 compares linear Pearson correlation coef-
ficient estimates based on FHS annual returns with calibration results on the basis
of rolling-window annual returns as well as CEIOPS/EIOPA’s empirical outcomes.
Index Data FHS annual Annualized Regulator
LPX
Original [0.6113, 0.6240] 0.7502
0.8359
Recent [0.6767, 0.6852] 0.7680
S&P GSCI
Original [0.0951, 0.1075] 0.0653
0.4472
Recent [0.1446, 0.1568] 0.0825
HFRX
Original [0.7611, 0.7670] 0.9664
0.7731
Recent [0.8071, 0.8114] 0.9433
BRIC
Original [0.6166, 0.6247] 0.6950
−52.82
Recent [0.6433, 0.6504] 0.6660
Table 5.25: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for linear Perason correlation
coefficient estimates in comparison to regulatory outcomes as well as results for
calibrations based on rolling-window annual returns.
For most indexes, the results using FHS annual returns seem to be lower than
the corresponding outcomes of calibrations based on rolling-window annualized
returns. Repeatedly, we cannot find a match with regulatory results.
In summary, the VaR-implied correlation approach as well as the data-cutting cor-
relation approach based on FHS annual returns exhibits results considerably dif-
ferent form CEIOPS/EIOPA’s outcomes. In fact, our results imply, that CEIOP-
S/EIOPA’s proposed correlation of 0.75 between ”global equity” and ”other eq-
uity” might be too close to ”1”.
The course of the median correlation coefficient estimates seems to be more sta-
ble for calibrations based on FHS annual returns than rolling-window annualized
returns. However, for the data-cutting approach, the width of the 95% boot-
strap confidence intervals for particularly low confidence intervals should be kept
in mind. Since per definition data-cutting correlation subject to small confidence
intervals rely on a particularly small set of observations, the large variation of cal-
ibration results for the different bootstrap samples is not astonishing. This again
implies the superiority of VaR-implied correlation towards data-cutting correlation
estimates.
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We also carried out correlation analysis on the basis of daily returns. Similar
to calibrations based on FHS annual returns, the course of VaR-implied and data-
cutting correlation coefficients seems to be more stable over varying confidence
levels than the corresponding coefficients based on rolling-window annualized re-
turns. The values of the correlation coefficients based on daily returns are similar
to the median outcomes obtained on the basis of FHS annual returns. However,
they tend to be slightly closer to 1. For plots and tables of calibration results
based on daily returns refer to Annex B.
5.5 Diversification within sub-risk modules
CEIOPS/EIOPA analyzes the correlation between the MSCI World as representa-
tive of the equity category ”global equity” and each of the four indexes representing
the category ”other equity”. However, the regulator proposes a single ”averaged”
correlation coefficient of 0.75 between the two categories. Correlation within the
category ”other equity” is not analyzed at all. Diversification benefits within this
category are thereby neglected. For property risk, there is no further breakdown
into sub-categories. Analyses concerning correlation within this risk module are
therefor relinquished.
In this part of our study, we analyze the regulator’s decisions concerning corre-
lations within property risk and within the equity category ”other equity”. We




Table 5.26 contains linear Pearson correlation coefficients based on daily returns
for all possible combinations of the four indexes representing the equity category
”other equity”. Table 5.26 and table 5.27 show the results for calibrations carried
on the original and recent data set.
14The use of annual FHS results for this part of analysis is conceivable, too
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Original data: Daily
Index LPX S&P GSCI HFRX BRIC
LPX 1 0.1857 0.5734 0.5114
S&P GSCI 1 0.3384 0.2264
HFRX 1 0.6606
BRIC 1
Table 5.26: Linear perason correlation coefficients within ”other equity” based
on the original data set.
Recent Data: Daily
Index LPX S&P GSCI HFRX BRIC
LPX 1 0.2311 0.6277 0.5253
S&P GSCI 1 0.3695 0.2648
HFRX 1 0.6467
BRIC 1
Table 5.27: Linear perason correlation coefficients within ”other equity” based
on the recent data set.
The results shown in the tables above imply a dependence pattern contrary to
CEIOPS/EIOPA’s assumption of perfect correlation within the category ”other
equity”. For almost all pairs of indexes and both data sets, linear correlation is
below 65%. According to linear correlation coefficients, the presence of diversifi-
cation effects is likely.
VaR-implied correlation
Next, we consider VaR-implied tail correlations between each possible pair of the
four indexes15. Table 5.28 summarizes the results.
15Note that at this point, we carry out analysis solely for the recent data sets. Analysis
regarding Pearson correlations within ”other equity” as well as previous analysis concerning
VaR-implied correlations based on non-annualized data showed that the difference between those
two data sets is negligible for this part of the study.
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LPX
1 − α S&P HFRX BRIC
0.995 0.6363 1 0.5775
0.99 0.4819 1 0.7166
0.98 0.3553 1 0.6032
0.97 0.3766 1 0.4894
0.96 0.3586 1 0.5819
0.95 0.348 1 0.5238
0.9 0.4272 1 0.5137
0.85 0.5191 0.9556 0.4664
0.8 0.5487 0.9982 0.5222
S&P





















Table 5.28: VaR-implied tail correlation coefficients within ”other equity” for
varying confidence levels based on the recent data set.
The results for VaR-implied correlations within ”other-equities” confirm the im-
pression implied by results for Pearson correlation calibrations. Except for pairs
involving the HFRX, correlations are clearly different from 1.
In summary, assuming perfect correlation within the sub-risk module equity seems
inexplicable. Our empirical study implies that diversification effects are likely
to exist within this module. With the relinquishment of correlation calibrations
within the equity category, those benefits are neglected.
5.5.2 Property
Pearson correlation
Table 5.29 and table 5.30 show linear Pearson correlation calibration results for
dependencies within the sub-risk module property. For this part of the study,
we carry out additional analysis on the original data set of indexes representing
property risk.
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Original data: Monthly
Index All prop. Offices City Off. Retail Warehouse
All prop. 1 0.9619 0.7927 0.9673 0.9000
Offices 1 0.8550 0.8689 0.8035
City Off. 1 0.7103 0.6683
Retail 1 0.9315
Warehouse 1
Table 5.29: Linear pearson correlation coefficients within property risk based
on the original data set.
Recent data: Monthly
Index All prop. Offices City off. Retail Warehouse
All prop. 1 0.9590 0.7887 0.9643 0.8946
Offices 1 0.8572 0.8575 0.7822
City Off. 1 0.6965 0.6393
Retail 1 0.9368
Warehouse 1
Table 5.30: Linear Pearson correlation coefficients within property risk based
on the recent data set.
For indexes representing property risk, linear correlation coefficients are close to
1 for almost all of the index combinations. Differences between the two data sets
are small and thus negligible.
VaR-implied correlation
Table 5.31 shows the results for VaR-implied tail correlation coefficient calibrations
carried out on recent data for property risk.
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All property
α Offices City off Retail Warehouse
0.995 1 0.8397 1 1
0.99 1 0.5349 0.9049 0.9106
0.98 0.9756 0.2796 1 0.939
0.97 1 1 0.8471 0.8361
0.96 0.9588 0.7944 1 0.5843
0.95 0.7713 0.9555 1 1
0.9 0.8746 1 0.6266 −0.2759
0.85 1 0.7872 1 1
0.8 1 −1 0.9354 1
Offices
α City off. Retail Wareh.
0.995 0.8976 1 1
0.99 0.5644 1 0.9483
0.98 0.4067 0.9638 1
0.97 1 1 0.7593
0.96 1 1 0.78
0.95 1 0.7457 0.9651
0.9 0.8765 0.3689 −1
0.85 1 1 −0.9886























Table 5.31: VaR-implied tail correlation coefficients within property risk for
varying confidence levels based on the recent data set.
The results for VaR-implied correlation coefficients within property risk are di-
verse. Overall, the results again imply a correlation of 1 ore close to 1. However,
for some index combinations and specific confidence levels there are a couple of
outliers reaching up to −1. Nonetheless, those outliers do not necessarily imply
a ”wrong” regulatory decision concerning the allowance of diversification effects
within the sub-risk module equity but rather leave room for doubts concerning the




The Solvency II framework was fully implemented with the beginning of 2016.
However, its development is not completed yet. Additional regulatory work on
Solvency II is already scheduled. This includes to a large extent the review of
Solvency Capital Requirement calculations based on the standard formula.
This thesis discussed the regulatory approach to calibrate standard formula pa-
rameters for the sub-risk modules equity and property risk. The main focus was
on the consequences of CEIOPS/EIOPA’s unfortunate decision to confront the
problem of too short data histories with the use of rolling-window annual returns.
[Mittnik, 2011] clearly showed, that this calibration methodology has severe falsify-
ing impact on the calibration results for both standard formula input parameters.
In the empirical part of this thesis, CEIOPS/EIOPA’s calibrations concerning
standard formula input parameters for equity risk and property risk were repli-
cated. The stress factors obtained by the regulator’s empirical analysis could be
unequivocally confirmed for both risk modules. However, regarding the correla-
tion coefficients between representatives of the equity category ”other equity” and
the index representing ”global equity” we could not obtain a clear match with
CEIOPS/EIOPA’s empirical result.
In a second step, we used a slightly modified version of the Filtered Historical Sim-
ulation methodology to circumvent the need of rolling-windows to transform daily
or respectively monthly prices into annual returns. We analyzed representing in-
dexes of both sub-risk modules. In general, the analysis implied an overestimation
of risk for calibrations foll regulatory approach, meaning VaR calibrations based
on rolling-window annualized returns. Especially for property risk, we obtained
substantially less negative results for VaR calibrations based on FHS annual re-
turns. For equity risk, the results were more diverse. For most of the indexes
calibrations annual returns obtained through FHS resulted in a similar or lower
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risk than proposed by the regulator. However, the MSCI BRIC as representative
of the equity type emerging markets revealed rather higher risk than it is implied
by CEIOPS/EIOPA.
Analysis concerning the aggregation of the categories ”global equity” and ”other
equity” implied that the proposed correlation of 0.75 might be too close to 1.
Although CEIOPS/EIOPA’s approach concerning calibration approaches has not
been fully determined, our analysis showed, that the VaR-implied correlation ap-
proach is superior to the data-cutting method. Also, analysis carried out on rolling-
window annualized returns possibly underestimates diversification benefits.
Lastly, the presence of diversification effects within the category ”other equity”
as well as the sub-risk module property was investigated. For property risk,
CEIOPS/EIOPA’s decision to neglect diversification within the sub-risk module
could be supported. However, indexes representing ”other equity” exhibit cor-
relations which are unequivocally different from 1. According to our analysis,
diversification benefits within the category are indeed present.
At several points, results of the empirical analysis implied that short data histories
might cause unstable calibration results. Time series representing property risk
are particularly short. In order to obtain more reliable calibration results, their
replacement might be considered.
Solvency II pursues the maintenance of sound risk management within the insur-
ance an reinsurance sector – in the present as well as in future. Along with many
others, this thesis indicated, that the calibration of the standard formula input
parameters still exhibits room for improvements. Parts of regulatory calibration
approaches might overestimate certain risks while present diversification effects
are neglected. This clearly impacts the amount of capital and insurer is required
to hold under Solvency II to a large degree. In order to prevent disadvantages
against insurance or reinsurance companies being reliant on the regulatory model,





The concept of copulas allows us to extend the measure of dependence beyond the
concept of correlation. With a given set of random variables (X1, . . . Xn), the idea
behind the approach is extract every information about their dependence struc-
ture out of their joint distribution function F .
Let U = (U1 . . . Ud) be a d-dimensional random vector and Uj its standard-
uniformly distributed margins on the interval [0, 1]. Then the d-dimensional dis-
tribution function CU : [0, 1]
d → [0, 1] is called copula. The importance and of
copulas and their meaning concerning the measurement of dependence is summa-
rized in (Sklar’s Theorem).
Theorem A.1. Let X1, . . . Xd be random variables with respective probability
distribution function FX1 , . . . FXd . Let FX denote the joint probability distribution
function. Then there is a Copula C : [0, 1]d → [0, 1] such that ∀x1, . . . xn ∈
[−∞,∞]
F (x1 . . . xn) = C(FX1(x1), . . . FXd(xd)) (A.1)
If the marginal distributions FX1 , . . . FXd are all continuous, the copula is unique
[McNeil et al., 2005]. In this case it also holds
C(u1, . . . , ud) = (F
−1
X1
(u1), . . . F
−1
Xd
(ud)), u1, . . . , un ∈ [0, 1] (A.2)
where F−1X1 . . . F
−1
Xn
denote the inverse distribution functions of FX1 . . . FXn [Schmidt
and Stadtmüller, 2006].
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A.2 Properties of VaR
VaR is translation invariant: ∀a ∈ R it holds that V aRα(X+a) = V aRα(L)+a.
Proof.
V aRα(L+ a) = inf{l ∈ R : FL+a(l) ≥ α}
= inf{l ∈ R : P (L+ a ≤ l) ≥ α}




= inf{y + a ∈ R : P (L ≤ y) ≥ α}
= a+ inf{y ∈ R : P (L ≤ y) ≥ α}
= a+ inf{y ∈ R : FL(y) ≥ α}
= a+ V aRα(L)
VaR is positive homogen: ∀λ ≥ 0 it holds that ρ(λL) = λρ(L).
Proof. First consider λ = 0 :
V aRα(λL) = V aRα(0)
= inf{l ∈ R : F0(l) ≥ α}
= inf{l ∈ R : P (O ≤ l) ≥ α}
= 0 = 0 ∗ V aRα(L).
Now consider λ > 0 :
V aRα(λL) = inf{l ∈ R : FλL(l) ≥ α}
= inf{l ∈ R : P (λL ≤ l) ≥ α}







= inf{λy ∈ R : P (L ≤ y) ≥ α}
= λinf{y ∈ R : FL(y)α}
= λV aRα(L)
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VaR is monoton: ∀L1, L2 with P (L1 ≤ L2) = 1 it holds that V aRα(L1) ≤
V aRα(L2).
Proof. We know that Fl(L) ≤ FY (l) since it holds L ≤ Y with probability 1.
V aRα(L) = inf{l ∈ R : FL(l) ≥ α}
≤ inf{l ∈ R : FY (l) ≥ α} = V aRα(Y )
VaR is not sub-additiv: V aR(L1 +L2) ≤ V aR(L1) + V aR(L2) does not hold in
general.





1, with P (Li = 1) = 0.5
0, with P (Li = 0) = 0.5
i = 1, 2.
Now, choose α = 0.3. Then
V aRα(Li) = inf{l ∈ R : FLi(l) ≥ 0.3} = 0.
Now consider the sum of L1 + L2. It holds




2, with P (L1 + L2 = 2) =
1
4
1, with P (L1 + L2 = 1) =
1
2
0, with P (L1 + L2 = 0) =
1
4
i = 1, 2.
V aRα(L1 + L2) = inf{l ∈ R : FL1+L2(l) ≥ 0.3} = 1
since
P (L1 + L2 < 0) =
1
4





V aRα(L1 + L2) 6= V aRα(L1) + V aRα(L1) = 0 + 0 = 0,
and therefore VaR is not subadditiv in general.
Appendix B
Empirical Appendix
B.1 Histograms of annualized returns
Equity
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Figure B.1: Histograms for indexes representing equity risk.
Property
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Figure B.2: Histograms for indexes representing property risk.
B.2 Returns
Equity
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Figure B.3: Weekly Returns of indexes representing equity risk.
Property
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Figure B.4: Monthly Returns of indexes representing property risk.
B.3 FHS Results
Equity
MSCI World Original Data MSCI World Recent Data
(p,q)1 ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(0, 0) [−41.28%,−39.32%] [−40.33%,−38.85%] [−42.33%,−40.59%] [−40.42%,−38.74%]
(0, 1) [−41.6%,−39.6%] [−40.7%,−39.2%] [−42.75%,−40.92%] [−40.91%,−39.26%]
(0, 2) [−42.66%,−40.92%] [−42.17%,−40.57%] [−43.27%,−41.62%] [−41.49%,−39.8%]
(1, 0) [−41.61%,−39.61%] [−40.75%,−39.27%] [−42.77%,−40.94%] [−40.93%,−39.29%]
(1, 1) [−41.29%,−39.27%] [−40.35%,−38.87%] [−43.37%,−41.58%] [−42.06%,−40.4%]
(1, 2) [−43.4%,−41.39%] [−43.37%,−41.75%] [−42.78%,−40.96%] [−42.17%,−40.34%]
(2, 0) [−42.76%,−40.96%] [−42.38%,−40.74%] [−43.3%,−41.68%] [−41.65%,−39.9%]
(2, 1) [−43.38%,−41.35%] [−43.32%,−41.75%] [−43.46%,−41.78%] [−42.17%,−40.36%]
(2, 2) [−42.97%,−40.84%] [−43.08%,−41.55%] [−43.38%,−41.73%] [−40.68%,−39.23%]
Table B.1: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for 99.5% VaR of MSCI World
Data after FHS.
LPX50 Original Data LPX50 Recent Data
(p,q) ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ N
(0, 0) [−72.86%,−69.36%] [−68.12%,−65.02%] [−74.51%,−71.09%] [−65.25%,−62.95%]
(0, 1) [−73.67%,−70.42%] [−69.13%,−66.22%] [−74.99%,−71.66%] [−65.44%,−62.98%]
(0, 2) [−77.35%,−74.19%] [−73.17%,−70.22%] [−75.58%,−72.45%] [−67.18%,−64.94%]
(1, 0) [−74.14%,−70.89%] [−69.65%,−66.68%] [−75.09%,−71.78%] [−65.46%,−63.02%]
(1, 1) [−81.71%,−79.08%] [−80.54%,−77.59%] [−79.55%,−76.92%] [−63.27%,−61.03%]
(1, 2) [−81.91%,−79.4%] [−80.71%,−78.04%] [−79.14%,−76.43%] [−73.77%,−71.58%]
(2, 0) [−78.46%,−75.63%] [−74.97%,−71.93%] [−76.14%,−72.88%] [−67.96%,−65.65%]
(2, 1) [−82.02%,−79.66%] [−80.95%,−78.18%] [−79.13%,−76.39%] [−73.6%,−71.38%]
(2, 2) [−81.83%,−79.14%] [−80.69%,−78.01%] [−78.63%,−76.04%] [−73.23%,−71.01%]
Table B.2: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for 99.5% VaR of LPX50 Data
after FHS.
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S&P GSCI Original Data S&P GSCI Recent Data
(p,q) ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(0, 0) [−48.68%,−47.14%] [−49.87%,−48.38%] [−44.01%,−42.19%] [−45.05%,−43.19%]
(0, 1) [−48.67%,−47.13%] [−50.08%,−48.65%] [−44.21%,−42.43%] [−45.83%,−44%]
(0, 2) [−50.31%,−48.66%] [−51.9%,−50.34%] [−44.92%,−43.14%] [−46.74%,−44.64%]
(1, 0) [−48.66%,−47.12%] [−50.12%,−48.65%] [−44.22%,−42.46%] [−45.9%,−44.15%]
(1, 1) [−52.41%,−50.82%] [−58.54%,−56.97%] [−48%,−46.1%] [−57.07%,−55.8%]
(1, 2) [−52.23%,−50.84%] [−54.45%,−53.07%] [−46.15%,−44.59%] [−57.11%,−55.81%]
(2, 0) [−50.45%,−48.77%] [−52.12%,−50.61%] [−45.12%,−43.3%] [−46.93%,−44.92%]
(2, 1) [−52.33%,−50.87%] [−54.65%,−53.37%] [−46.38%,−44.81%] [−57.11%,−55.81%]
(2, 2) [−51.25%,−49.62%] [−53.31%,−51.78%] [−44.63%,−42.87%] [−56.85%,−55.6%]
Table B.3: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for 99.5% VaR of S&P GSCI
Data after FHS.
HFRX Original Data HFRX Recent Data
(p,q) ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ N
(0, 0) [−14.97%,−13.89%] [−16.41%,−15.31%] [−14.37%,−13.73%] [−13.98%,−13.37%]
(0, 1) [−16.28%,−15.38%] [−17.66%,−16.56%] [−15.23%,−14.58%] [−15.38%,−14.78%]
(0, 2) [−17.66%,−16.64%] [−19.58%,−18.3%] [−17.84%,−17.16%] [−17.44%,−16.7%]
(1, 0) [−16.85%,−16.12%] [−18.6%,−17.33%] [−16.99%,−16.25%] [−16.08%,−15.48%]
(1, 1) [−21.06%,−20%] [−25.76%,−24.39%] [−20.8%,−20.01%] [−22%,−21.43%]
(1, 2) [−20.98%,−19.77%] [−25.15%,−23.91%] [−20.53%,−19.74%] [−21.95%,−21.29%]
(2, 0) [−19.03%,−17.99%] [−21.53%,−20.36%] [−19.24%,−18.44%] [−18.64%,−17.94%]
(2, 1) [−21.03%,−19.85%] [−25.39%,−24.14%] [−20.45%,−19.69%] [−21.88%,−21.19%]
(2, 2) [−21.54%,−20.33%] [−26.59%,−25.08%] [−21.2%,−20.49%] [−22.73%,−22.04%]
Table B.4: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for 99.5% VaR of HFRX Data
after FHS.
MSCI BRIC Original Data MSCI BRIC Recent Data
(p,q) ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(0, 0) [−64.18%,−61.93%] [−68.33%,−65.76%] [−61.34%,−59.64%] [−62.44%,−60.74%]
(0, 1) [−65.47%,−63.33%] [−69.78%,−67.64%] [−62.66%,−61.06%] [−64%,−62.07%]
(0, 2) [−67.6%,−65.65%] [−73.67%,−72.01%] [−65.25%,−63.37%] [−66.87%,−64.72%]
(1, 0) [−65.79%,−63.67%] [−70.24%,−68.32%] [−63.1%,−61.34%] [−64.48%,−62.49%]
(1, 1) [−70.79%,−69.01%] [−78.33%,−76.44%] [−68.61%,−66.89%] [−70.63%,−68.77%]
(1, 2) [−66.31%,−64.19%] [−71.72%,−69.59%] [−68.66%,−66.96%] [−64.77%,−62.87%]
(2, 0) [−68.46%,−66.53%] [−75.82%,−73.61%] [−66.11%,−64.22%] [−68.04%,−65.86%]
(2, 1) [−67.02%,−64.81%] [−72.88%,−70.68%] [−64.14%,−62.33%] [−65.71%,−63.83%]
(2, 2) [−71.51%,−69.69%] [−79.08%,−77.45%] [−68.02%,−66.29%] [−70.46%,−68.86%]
Table B.5: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for 99.5% VaR of MSCI BRIC
Data after FHS.
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Property
(p,q) ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
All
Property
(0, 0) [4.58%, 4.95%] [4.58%, 4.91%]
(0, 1) [2.54%, 2.89%] [1.79%, 2.20%]
(0, 2) [−0.62%,−0.01%] [−1.53%,−0.71%]
(1, 0) [−10.65%,−9.52%] [−13.98%,−12.93%]
(1, 1) [−6.20%,−5.52%] [−9.16%,−8.11%]
(1, 2) [−6.44%,−5.63%] [−9.21%,−8.11%]
(2, 0) [−7.91%,−7.04%] [−10.15%,−9.24%]
(2, 1) [−9.84%,−8.87%] [−9.13%,−8.04%]
(2, 2) [−6.72%,−6.06%] [−7.90%,−7.09%]
Table B.6: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for 99.5% VaR of All Property
Data after FHS.
(p,q) ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
Offices
(0, 0) [2.21%, 2.69%] [2.08%, 2.58%]
(0, 1) [−0.02%, 0.65%] [−0.14%, 0.55%]
(0, 2) [−3.74%,−3.00%] [−3.46%,−2.70%]
(1, 0) [−14.78%,−13.59%] [−13.77%,−12.45%]
(1, 1) [−10.58%,−9.51%] [−10.53%,−9.25%]
(1, 2) [−10.35%,−9.24%] [−10.55%,−9.23%]
(2, 0) [−13.22%,−11.90%] [−12.15%,−10.65%]
(2, 1) [−10.55%,−9.35%] [−10.52%,−9.25%]
(2, 2) [−9.87%,−8.75%] [−9.74%,−8.53%]
Table B.7: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for 99.5% VaR of Offices Data
after FHS.
(p,q) ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
City
offices
(0, 0) [−00.04%,+00.48%] [−01.23%,−00.50%]
(0, 1) [−02.95%,−02.38%] [−03.51%,−02.95%]
(0, 2) [−04.42%,−03.78%] [−05.15%,−04.42%]
(1, 0) [−10.82%,−10.12%] [−10.78%,−09.99%]
(1, 1) [−10.10%,−09.25%] [−07.41%,−06.67%]
(1, 2) [−09.88%,−09.04%] [−07.33%,−06.61%]
(2, 0) [−11.88%,−11.09%] [−09.83%,−09.08%]
(2, 1) [−10.73%,−09.87%] [−07.32%,−06.61%]
(2, 2) [−09.29%,−08.51%] [−07.20%,−06.39%]
Table B.8: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for 99.5% VaR of City Offices
Data after FHS.
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(p,q) ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
Retail
(0, 0) [2.56%, 2.99%] [2.57%, 2.99%]
(0, 1) [2.38%, 2.68%] [1.44%, 1.86%]
(0, 2) [−0.03%, 0.37%] [−0.36%, 0.17%]
(1, 0) [−8.70%,−7.97%] [−8.94%,−8.17%]
(1, 1) [−6.95%,−6.36%] [−6.50%,−5.93%]
(1, 2) [−4.22%,−3.84%] [−6.59%,−6.00%]
(2, 0) [−7.49%,−6.87%] [−6.86%,−6.29%]
(2, 1) [−6.99%,−6.37%] [−6.53%,−5.91%]
(2, 2) [−6.29%,−5.72%] [−6.30%,−5.74%]
Table B.9: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for 99.5% VaR of Retail Data
after FHS.
(p,q) ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
Warehouse
(0, 0) [04.06%, 04.44%] [03.90%, 04.23%]
(0, 1) [02.62%, 03.11%] [02.13%, 02.64%]
(0, 2) [01.42%, 01.94%] [00.29%, 00.84%]
(1, 0) [−06.10%,−05.38%] [−08.99%,−08.05%]
(1, 1) [−05.17%,−04.54%] [−07.31%,−06.49%]
(1, 2) [−05.24%,−04.64%] [−07.32%,−06.36%]
(2, 0) [−05.51%,−04.87%] [−08.03%,−07.15%]
(2, 1) [−05.24%,−04.61%] [−07.22%,−06.44%]
(2, 2) [−05.29%,−04.70%] [−05.95%,−05.14%]
Table B.10: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for 99.5% VaR of Industrial
Data after FHS.
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B.4 AIC and BIC Criteria
Equity
MSCI Original Data MSCI Recent Data
ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(p,q) AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
(0, 0) −1.0248 −1.0225 −1.0322 −1.0294 −1.1755 −1.1732 −1.18420 −1.1813
(0, 1) −1.0246 −1.0218 −1.0321 −1.0287 −1.1753 −1.1725 −1.1840 −1.1805
(0, 2) −1.0245 −1.0212 −1.0321 −1.0282 −1.1753 −1.1718 −1.1840 −1.18
(1, 0) −1.0246 −1.0218 −1.0321 −1.02870 −1.1753 −1.1725 −1.184 −1.1805
(1, 1) −1.0244 −1.0211 −1.0319 −1.0279 −1.1753 −1.1719 −1.1838 −1.1798
(1, 2) −1.0244 −1.0205 −1.0321 −1.0276 −1.1751 −1.1711 −1.1839 −1.1793
(2, 0) −1.0245 −1.0212 −1.0321 −1.0282 −1.1753 −1.1718 −1.1840 −1.18
(2, 1) −1.0244 −1.0205 −1.0321 −1.0276 −1.1751 −1.1711 −1.1839 −1.1793
(2, 2) −1.0243 −1.0198 −1.0318 −1.0268 −1.1749 −1.1703 −1.1837 −1.1785
×1.0e+ 04 for all values
Table B.11: AIC/BIC for the MSCI World.
LPX50 Original Data LPX50 Recent Data
ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(p,q) AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
(0, 0) −3.7832 −3.7643 −3.8199 −3.7963 −5.1414 −5.1212 −5.2105 −5.1853
(0, 1) −3.7827 −3.7591 −3.8197 −3.7913 −5.1396 −5.1144 −5.2085 −5.1783
(0, 2) −3.7872 −3.7589 −3.8259 −3.7928 −5.1467 −5.1165 −5.2202 −5.185
(1, 0) −3.783 −3.7594 −3.8201 −3.7917 −5.1396 −5.1144 −5.2085 −5.1783
(1, 1) −3.7951 −3.7633 −3.8372 −3.8023 −5.1485 −5.1183 −5.2117 −5.1765
(1, 2) −3.7964 −3.7668 −3.8354 −3.7994 −5.1509 −5.1157 −5.2239 −5.1836
(2, 0) −3.7888 −3.7605 −3.8279 −3.7948 −5.1476 −5.1174 −5.2209 −5.1857
(2, 1) −3.7963 −3.7632 −3.8371 −3.7993 −5.1512 −5.116 −5.2246 −5.1843
(2, 2) −3.7944 −3.7566 −3.8352 −3.7927 −5.15 −5.1097 −5.2241 −5.1788
×1.0e+ 03 for all values
Table B.12: AIC/BIC for the LPX50.
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S&P GSCI Original Data S&P GSCI Recent Data
ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(p,q) AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
(0, 0) −9.8338 −9.8112 −9.8660 −9.8378 −1.1194 −1.1171 −1.1244 −1.1215
(0, 1) −9.8318 −9.8036 −9.8642 −9.8304 −1.1193 −1.1164 −1.1243 −1.1208
(0, 2) −9.8325 −9.7987 −9.866 −9.8261 −1.1194 −1.1159 −1.1245 −1.1204
(1, 0) −9.8318 −9.8036 −9.8643 −9.8304 −1.1193 −1.1164 −1.1243 −1.1208
(1, 1) −9.8323 −9.7984 −9.8683 −9.8288 −1.1195 −1.1160 −1.125 −1.121
(1, 2) −9.8330 −9.7935 −9.8666 −9.8215 −1.1195 −1.1154 −1.1248 −1.1202
(2, 0) −9.8325 −9.7986 −9.8658 −9.8263 −1.1194 −1.1160 −1.1245 −1.1205
(2, 1) −9.8328 −9.7933 −9.8665 −9.8213 −1.1195 −1.1154 −1.1248 −1.1202
(2, 2) −9.8330 −9.7879 −9.8658 −9.815 −1.1196 −1.115 −1.1249 −1.1197
×1.0e+ 03 for original data
×1.0e+ 04 for recent data
Table B.13: AIC/BIC for the S&P GSCI.
HFRX Original Data HFRX Recent Data
ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(p,q) AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
(0, 0) −2.5596 −2.5442 −2.5857 −2.5664 −4.8662 −4.8483 −4.9181 −4.8957
(0, 1) −2.5606 −2.5413 −2.5871 −2.5640 −4.8490 −4.8266 −4.9252 −4.8983
(0, 2) −2.5623 −2.5392 −2.5903 −2.5633 −4.8801 −4.8532 −4.9329 −4.9015
(1, 0) −2.536 −2.5167 −2.5883 −2.5651 −4.8771 −4.8547 −4.9275 −4.9006
(1, 1) −2.5651 −2.5420 −2.597 −2.5699 −4.8823 −4.8554 −4.9375 −4.9062
(1, 2) −2.5637 −2.5367 −2.5960 −2.5651 −4.8804 −4.8490 −4.9355 −4.8997
(2, 0) −2.5639 −2.5407 −2.5931 −2.566 −4.8818 −4.8549 −4.9348 −4.9035
(2, 1) −2.5637 −2.5367 −2.5961 −2.5652 −4.8804 −4.8491 −4.9356 −4.8997
(2, 2) −2.5632 −2.5323 −2.5962 −2.5614 −4.8803 −4.8444 −4.9375 −4.8971
×1.0e+ 03 for all values
Table B.14: AIC/BIC for the HFRX.
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MSCI BRIC Original Data MSCI BRIC Recent Data
ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(p,q) AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
(0, 0) −2.9551 −2.9365 −2.9870 −2.9645 −4.2480 −4.2281 −4.2864 −4.2615
(0, 1) −2.9552 −2.9319 −2.9874 −2.9594 −4.2493 −4.2244 −4.2878 −4.2578
(0, 2) −2.9572 −2.9292 −2.9947 −2.9620 −4.2552 −4.2252 −4.2975 −4.2626
(1, 0) −2.9555 −2.9322 −2.988 −2.96 −4.25 −4.225 −4.2885 −4.2586
(1, 1) −2.9608 −2.9328 −2.9972 −2.9645 −4.2566 −4.2267 −4.2981 −4.2632
(1, 2) −2.9571 −2.9245 −2.9949 −2.9576 −4.2547 −4.2197 −4.2954 −4.2555
(2, 0) −2.9577 −2.9298 −2.9962 −2.9636 −4.2557 −4.2258 −4.2985 −4.2636
(2, 1) −2.9574 −2.9248 −2.9959 −2.9587 −4.2538 −4.2189 −4.2971 −4.2572
(2, 2) −2.9574 −2.9201 −2.9992 −2.9573 −4.2547 −4.2148 −4.3010 −4.2561
×1.0e+ 03 for all values
Table B.15: AIC/BIC for the MSCI BRIC.
Property
ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(p,q) AIC BIC AIC BIC
All
Property
(0, 0) −2.581 −2.5656 −2.5804 −2.5611
(0, 1) −2.7351 −2.7158 −2.7309 −2.7078
(0, 2) −2.7809 −2.7578 −2.8032 −2.7762
(1, 0) −2.9274 −2.9081 −2.9823 −2.9591
(1, 1) −2.9539 −2.9307 −2.9963 −2.9693
(1, 2) −2.953 −2.9260 −2.9951 −2.9642
(2, 0) −2.9493 −2.9262 −2.9940 −2.9670
(2, 1) −2.9467 −2.9197 −2.9945 −2.9636
(2, 2) −2.9621 −2.9312 −2.9931 −2.9584
×1.0e+ 03 for all values
Table B.16: AIC/BIC for all property.
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ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(p,q) AIC BIC AIC BIC
Offices
(0, 0) −2.4430 −2.4276 −2.4443 −2.425
(0, 1) −2.6148 −2.5955 −2.6356 −2.6125
(0, 2) −2.6754 −2.6522 −2.6952 −2.6682
(1, 0) −2.8239 −2.8046 −2.8599 −2.8367
(1, 1) −2.8411 −2.8179 −2.8762 −2.8492
(1, 2) −2.8394 −2.8123 −2.8742 −2.8433
(2, 0) −2.8338 −2.8107 −2.8718 −2.8448
(2, 1) −2.8391 −2.8121 −2.8742 −2.8433
(2, 2) −2.8420 −2.8111 −2.8783 −2.8436
×1.0e+ 03 for all values
Table B.17: AIC/BIC for offices.
ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(p,q) AIC BIC AIC BIC
City
offices
(0, 0) −2.183 −2.1676 −2.2259 −2.2066
(0, 1) −2.2848 −2.2656 −2.3354 −2.3122
(0, 2) −2.2888 −2.2657 −2.3548 −2.3278
(1, 0) −2.3443 −2.3250 −2.4157 −2.3926
(1, 1) −2.3743 −2.3512 −2.4555 −2.4285
(1, 2) −2.3725 −2.3455 −2.4535 −2.4227
(2, 0) −2.3610 −2.3379 −2.4376 −2.4105
(2, 1) −2.3728 −2.3458 −2.4536 −2.4227
(2, 2) −2.3912 −2.3603 −2.4556 −2.4209
×1.0e+ 03 for all values
Table B.18: AIC/BIC for city offices.
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ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(p,q) AIC BIC AIC BIC
Retail
(0, 0) −2.5838 −2.5684 −2.5816 −2.5624
(0, 1) −2.7048 −2.6855 −2.7221 −2.699
(0, 2) −2.7613 −2.7381 −2.7722 −2.7452
(1, 0) −2.8887 −2.8694 −2.9145 −2.8914
(1, 1) −2.9046 −2.8815 −2.9285 −2.9015
(1, 2) −2.8632 −2.8362 −2.9268 −2.8959
(2, 0) −2.9034 −2.8803 −2.9258 −2.8988
(2, 1) −2.9032 −2.8762 −2.9266 −2.8957
(2, 2) −2.8994 −2.8685 −2.9264 −2.8917
×1.0e+ 03 for all values
Table B.19: AIC/BIC for retail.
ǫt ∼ N ǫt ∼ t
(p,q) AIC BIC AIC BIC
All
Property
(0, 0) −2.4166 −2.4011 −2.4221 −2.4028
(0, 1) −2.5304 −2.5111 −2.5683 −2.5452
(0, 2) −2.5576 −2.5345 −2.6063 −2.5793
(1, 0) −2.6435 −2.6242 −2.7131 −2.6899
(1, 1) −2.6579 −2.6347 −2.7194 −2.6924
(1, 2) −2.6562 −2.6292 −2.7191 −2.6883
(2, 0) −2.6564 −2.6332 −2.7169 −2.6899
(2, 1) −2.6562 −2.6292 −2.7177 −2.6869
(2, 2) −2.6554 −2.6246 −2.7201 −2.6854
×1.0e+ 03 for all values
Table B.20: AIC/BIC for warehouse.
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B.5 Param. Estimates
Equity
Data ǫt (p,q) Parameter Estimate Stand. Error t-statistic
MSCI World
∼ N (0,0)
φ0 0.00216979 0.000365323 5.93938
Original
α0 1.8045e-05 3.14972e-06 5.72906
α1 0.142444 0.00973617 14.6304
β1 0.817434 0.015557 52.5443
∼ t (0,0)
φ0 0.00212008 0.00035961 5.89549
α0 1.1314e-05 3.29802e-06 3.43054
α1 0.0922449 0.0160336 5.75324
β1 0.879075 0.0209436 41.9734
DoF 8.29272 1.13508 7.30581
MSCI World
∼ N (0,0)
φ0 0.00215796 0.000347232 6.21474
Recent
α0 1.98181e-05 3.31083e-06 5.98583
α1 0.142324 0.00955968 14.8879
β1 0.813466 0.0154083 52.7942
∼ t (0,0)
φ0 0.00211991 0.000339589 6.24259
α0 1.2692e-05 3.39447e-06 3.73903
α1 0.0953547 0.0153441 6.21442
β1 0.872878 0.0201109 43.4032
DoF 8.29278 1.05563 7.85576
Table B.21: Parameter estimates for chosen ARMA-GARCH models: MSCI
World.
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Data ǫt (p,q) Param. Estimate Stand. Error t-statistic
LPX50
∼ N (1,2)
φ0 0.000763745 0.000459514 1.66207
Original
φ1 0.768521 0.120179 6.39479
ψ1 -0.762193 0.126291 -6.0352
ψ2 0.0703712 0.037389 1.88214
α0 1.04693e-05 3.32891e-06 3.14496
α1 0.13804 0.0119963 11.5069
β1 0.861959 0.0134639 64.0202
∼ t (1,2)
φ0 0.000750974 0.000386505 1.94299
φ1 0.781838 0.0965395 8.09864
ψ1 -0.780076 0.101069 -7.71824
ψ2 0.0766913 0.0340933 2.24945
α0 9.07685e-06 3.91286e-06 2.31975
α1 0.103634 0.0213897 4.84506
β1 0.890795 0.0201646 44.1761
DoF 6.25678 0.986726 6.34096
LPX50
∼ N (0,0)
φ0 0.00346488 0.00061159 5.665361
Recent
α0 1.17509e-05 3.76704e-06 3.11939
α1 0.149019 0.012309 12.1065
β1 0.850981 0.0144427 58.921
∼ t (2,0)
φ0 0.00309297 0.000601204 5.14462
φ1 0.00708075 0.0312474 0.226603
φ2 0.114293 0.0303428 3.76671
α0 9.15048e-06 3.92017e-06 2.3342
α1 0.10053 0.0209365 4.80169
β1 0.893057 0.0200618 44.5153
DoF 6.28284 0.986663 6.36777
Table B.22: Parameter estimates for chosen ARMA-GARCH models: LPX50.
Appendix B. Empirical Appendix 87
Data ǫt (p,q) Param. Estimate Stand. Error t-statistic
S&P GSCI
∼ N (0,0)
φ0 0.00219891 0.000418299 5.25679
Original
α0 1.01743e-05 2.329e-06 4.36853
α1 0.100473 0.0114386 8.78369
β1 0.886929 0.0120913 73.3526
∼ t (0,0)
φ0 0.00238073 0.000433009 5.49811
α0 9.82857e-06 3.08145e-06 3.18959
α1 0.100828 0.0148571 6.78655
β1 0.887844 0.0155529 57.0853
DoF 9.75914 2.1304 4.5809
S&P GSCI
∼ N (0,0)
φ0 0.00178212 0.00040193 4.4339
Recent
α0 8.79903e-06 1.85943e-06 4.73212
α1 0.0878656 0.00931001 9.43775
β1 0.901318 0.009459 95.2868
∼ t (0,0)
φ0 0.00203403 0.000413185 4.92282
α0 9.18197e-06 2.75048e-06 3.33831
α1 0.0908625 0.0129594 7.01131
β1 0.898363 0.0133348 67.3697
DoF 8.82261 1.56374 5.64198
Table B.23: Parameter estimates for chosen ARMA-GARCH models: GSCI.
Data ǫt (p,q) Parameter Estimate Stand. Error t-statistic
HFRX
∼ N (0,0)
φ0 0.00128108 0.000303174 4.22558
Original
α0 7.11971e-06 1.42674e-06 4.99019
α1 0.309917 0.067815 4.57003
β1 0.563896 0.0805339 7.00197
∼ t (1,1)
φ0 0.000362522 0.000179108 2.02404
φ1 0.823612 0.0902572 9.12517
ψ1 -0.696608 0.118892 -5.85916
α0 8.39716e-06 3.11567e-06 2.69514
α1 0.274593 0.103007 2.66577
β1 0.567122 0.124238 4.56479
DoF 4.36598 1.13111 3.85991
HFRX
∼ N (1,1)
φ0 0.00022922 0.000153631 1.49202
Recent
φ1 0.683861 0.12722 5.37544
ψ1 -0.531457 0.15707 -3.38356
α0 5.47725e-06 2.15146e-06 2.54583
α1 0.200921 0.0314088 6.39697
β1 0.658891 0.0631905 10.4271
∼ t (1,1)
φ0 0.000261955 0.000120519 2.17355
φ1 0.811242 0.0837947 9.6813
ψ1 -0.695121 0.105417 -6.59401
α0 5.65734e-06 2.67864e-06 2.11202
α1 0.149581 0.0447186 3.34494
β1 0.697307 0.0855676 8.14919
DoF 4.69863 0.906382 5.18394
Table B.24: Parameter estimates for chosen ARMA-GARCH models: HFRX.
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Data ǫt (p,q) Parameter Estimate Stand. Error t-statistic
MSCI BRIC
∼ N (0,0)
φ0 0.00469493 0.00118844 3.95051
Original
α0 8.24773e-05 2.09489e-05 3.93707
α1 0.138927 0.0216343 6.42161
β1 0.810021 0.0290884 27.8468
∼ t (0,0)
φ0 0.00537562 0.00112216 4.79043
α0 6.57746e-05 2.67399e-05 2.45979
α1 0.138913 0.0340882 4.07512
β1 0.825952 0.0387672 21.3054
DoF 6.02959 1.46622 4.11233
MSCI BRIC
∼ N (0,0)
φ0 0.00276169 0.000972906 2.8386
Recent
α0 6.64198e-05 1.6203e-05 4.09923
α1 0.124209 0.017512 7.09276
β1 0.827093 0.0249185 33.1918
∼ t (2,0)
φ0 0.0026862 0.000903528 2.97302
φ1 0.0579067 0.0314365 1.84202
φ2 0.108501 0.0319006 3.40122
α0 5.95883e-05 2.11898e-05 2.81213
α1 0.115328 0.0257362 4.48118
β1 0.841532 0.0329732 25.5217
DoF 6.45653 1.34318 4.80689
Table B.25: Parameter estimates for chosen ARMA-GARCH models: MSCI
BRIC.
Property
Data ǫt (p,q) Parameter Estimate Stand. Error t-statistic
All Prop
∼ N (2,2)
φ0 0.00102886 0.000392135 2.62375
Recent
φ1 -0.0591907 0.0224054 -2.6418
φ2 0.919202 0.0220665 41.6559
ψ1 0.707915 0.0649291 10.9029
ψ2 -0.274542 0.0628853 -4.36576
α0 5.18075e-07 6.28978e-07 0.823677
α1 0.677037 0.0380464 17.795
β1 0.322963 0.0545632 5.91906
∼ t (1,1)
φ0 0.000493899 0.000171297 2.88328
φ1 0.922869 0.0188978 48.8348
ψ1 -0.247396 0.061299 -4.03589
α0 8.21526e-07 7.85982e-07 1.04522
α1 0.384214 0.0997638 3.85124
β1 0.615786 0.0622294 9.89542
DoF 4.61414 0.966867 4.77226
Table B.26: Parameter estimates for chosen ARMA-GARCH models: IPD
UK All Property.
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Data ǫt (p,q) Parameter Estimate Stand. Error t-statistic
Offices
∼ N (1,1)
φ0 0.000370845 0.000173782 2.13396
Recent
φ1 0.947684 0.0183722 51.5825
ψ1 -0.364651 0.0553234 -6.59126
α0 5.24782e-07 6.85012e-07 0.766091
α1 0.303069 0.0483977 6.26206
β1 0.696931 0.0382543 18.2184
∼ t (1,1)
φ0 0.000463707 0.000174777 2.65313
φ1 0.924637 0.0203226 45.4981
ψ1 -0.292208 0.0644576 -4.53333
α0 5.16142e-07 7.30348e-07 0.706707
α1 0.312918 0.0768141 4.07371
β1 0.687081 0.0556175 12.3537
DoF 5.95557 1.35268 4.4028
Table B.27: Parameter estimates for chosen ARMA-GARCH models: IPD
UK Office.
Data ǫt (p,q) Parameter Estimate Stand. Error t-statistic
City offices
∼ N (2,2)
φ0 0.000898617 0.000523684 1.71595
Recent
φ1 0.330214 0.0887795 3.71948
φ2 0.586614 0.0763998 7.67822
ψ1 0.229703 0.108091 2.1251
ψ2 -0.453643 0.0682958 -6.64233
α0 1.0805e-06 7.96288e-07 1.35692
α1 0.168969 0.0239039 7.0687
β1 0.831031 0.0158745 52.3499
∼ t (1,1)
φ0 0.00100725 0.000276742 3.63965
φ1 0.86812 0.0285575 30.3991
ψ1 -0.476912 0.0591585 -8.0616
α0 2.42071e-06 1.90292e-06 1.2721
α1 0.18787 0.0769987 2.43991
β1 0.81213 0.04257 19.0775
DoF 2.93884 0.516924 5.68524
Table B.28: Parameter estimates for chosen ARMA-GARCH models: IPD
UK City Offices.
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Data ǫt (p,q) Parameter Estimate Stand. Error t-statistic
Retail
∼ N (1,1)
φ0 0.000515259 0.00024487 2.10422
Recent
φ1 0.925479 0.0281024 32.9324
ψ1 -0.284466 0.0748298 -3.80151
α0 1.54438e-06 9.64595e-07 1.60106
α1 0.360844 0.056004 6.44317
β1 0.593749 0.0546824 10.8581
∼ t (1,1)
φ0 0.000562495 0.000200358 2.80745
φ1 0.907769 0.0244622 37.109
ψ1 -0.257638 0.0689975 -3.73403
α0 1.44203e-06 1.04655e-06 1.37789
α1 0.425464 0.123124 3.45556
β1 0.574536 0.077588 7.40496
DoF 4.65734 1.32627 3.5116
Table B.29: Parameter estimates for chosen ARMA-GARCH models: IPD
UK Retail.
Data ǫt (p,q) Parameter Estimate Stand. Error t-statistic
Warehouse
∼ N (1,1)
φ0 0.000804766 0.00035475 2.26854
Recent
φ1 0.908565 0.0351814 25.8252
ψ1 -0.304846 0.077401 -3.93853
α0 8.59639e-07 7.58427e-07 1.13345
α1 0.259074 0.0410113 6.31714
β1 0.740926 0.0284269 26.0643
∼ t (1,1)
φ0 0.000948878 0.000294503 3.22197
φ1 0.863781 0.0309399 27.918
ψ1 -0.20804 0.0703957 -2.95529
α0 1.3596e-06 1.06883e-06 1.27205
α1 0.358192 0.100956 3.54799
β1 0.641808 0.0598325 10.7268
DoF 4.05647 0.736296 5.50929
Table B.30: Parameter estimates for chosen ARMA-GARCH models: IPD
UK Warehouse.
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B.6 Correlation based on Daily Returns
VaR-Implied
LPX50 S&P GSCI HFRX BRIC
α Original Recent Original Recent Original Recent Original Recent
0.995 1 0.9427 0.0015 0.1625 1 1 1 0.8094
0.99 1 1 0.1908 0.306 1 1 1 0.8903
0.98 0.8203 0.9839 0.0723 0.2037 1 1 0.908 0.8732
0.97 1 1 0.1124 0.1598 1 1 0.8835 0.828
0.96 1 1 0.1154 0.1707 1 1 0.7994 0.9052
0.95 1 0.98 0.094 0.17 1 1 0.7421 0.7966
0.9 0.9349 0.9278 0.1139 0.1627 1 1 0.8011 0.7947
0.85 0.7427 0.76 0.1258 0.1617 1 1 0.805 0.8088
0.8 0.6224 0.6414 0.1768 0.205 1 1 0.8083 0.7649
Table B.31: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for VaR-implied correlation
coefficients between ”global equity” and ”other equity” based on daily returns
of recent data.
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Figure B.5: based on daily returns in comparison to results of calibrations
based on rolling-window annual returns.
Data Cutting
LPX50 S&P GSCI HFRX BRIC
α Original Recent Original Recent Original Recent Original Recent
0.995 0.2123 0.2927 0.4152 0.4606 0.4541 0.4677 0.544 0.6533
0.99 0.5822 0.5405 0.6236 0.6396 0.5076 0.7078 0.4858 0.491
0.98 0.6661 0.7001 0.7292 0.6955 0.6212 0.5823 0.5905 0.6068
0.97 0.6724 0.6944 0.7487 0.7287 0.5467 0.3909 0.5407 0.5591
0.96 0.7168 0.7189 0.7644 0.7338 0.4065 0.5169 0.5197 0.5315
0.95 0.747 0.7306 0.605 0.596 0.4864 0.5501 0.5394 0.5476
0.9 0.6943 0.7023 0.5639 0.5406 0.4917 0.5316 0.5633 0.5485
0.85 0.6873 0.701 0.5163 0.4915 0.5092 0.5353 0.5695 0.5492
0.8 0.6844 0.6996 0.4581 0.4439 0.5555 0.5722 0.5787 0.5624
Table B.32: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for data-cutting correlation
coefficients between ”global equity” and ”other equity” based on daily returns
of recent data.
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Figure B.6: Data-cutting correlation based on daily returns in comparison to
results of calibrations based on rolling-window annual returns.
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Pearson Correlation
Annualized Returns Daily Returns
Regulator
Original Data Recent Data Original Data Recent Data
LPX50 0.7502 0.7680 0.6706 0.6971 0.8359
S&P GSCI 0.0653 0.0825 0.1290 0.1848 0.4472
HFRX 0.9664 0.9433 0.6900 0.7110 0.7731
MSCI BRIC 0.6950 0.6660 0.5921 0.6072 −0.5282
Table B.33: Linear Pearson correlation coefficients between ”global equity”
and ”other equity” based on daily and annualized returns in comparison.
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The indexes are extracted from Bloomberg1. Data representing equity risk are
available in form of daily closing prices. Indexes representing property risk are
provided on a monthly price basis. For each of the two investigated risk modules,
indexes are combined in one excel file. For each module, there are two data sets –
the original and the recent data set. Thus, data for this thesis is provided in four
excel files,
• Daily Prices Equity Recent.xlsx
• Daily Prices Equity Original.xlsx
• Monthly Prices Property Recent.xlsx
• Monthly Prices Property Original.xlsx
1Except the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index which is directly extracted from the HFR
website: https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/family-indices/hfrx.
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MATLAB Code
The MATLAB code required for the empirical part of this thesis is divided in
several functions and programs. Those functions and programs are topically stored
in several sub-folders. Figure C.1 gives an overview.
Figure C.1: Summary of the written programs and functions for the empirical
analysis.
Thesis
This folder contains a pdf version of the master thesis.
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